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COPYRIGHT AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS
Mark Bartholomew*
Copyright is typically described as a mechanism for encouraging the production
of creative works. On this view, copyright protection should be granted to genuinely
creative works but denied to non-creative ones. Yet that is not how the law works.
Instead, almost anything—from test answer sheets to instruction manuals to replicas
of items in the public domain—is deemed creative and therefore eligible for copyright
protection. This is the consequence of a century of copyright doctrine assuming that
artistic creativity is incapable of measurement, unaffected by personal motivation, and
incomprehensible to novices and experts alike. Recent neuroscientific research
contradicts these assumptions. It turns out that creativity can be partially measured,
that authorial intent is critical to creative production, and that expertise and creative
output are highly correlated. If copyright law’s goal is truly to promote creativity, it
should define that foundational concept to accord with scientific fact.



357

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

© 2021 Mark Bartholomew. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. Thanks to Christine
Bartholomew, Guyora Binder, Michael Boucai, John Tehranian, and Jim Wooten for their
helpful suggestions.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 184 Side A

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 358
I. CREATIVITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW ................................................ 362
A. “Substantively Impotent” Test ............................................364
B. Art and the Subjective .......................................................368
C. Creativity Without Context ................................................373
D. Copyright Populism ..........................................................376
II. CREATIVITY: A NEUROSCIENTIFIC VIEW ..................................... 382
A. Measuring the Creative Process ..........................................383
B. Motivating Individuals .....................................................389
C. Specifying the Creative Domain ..........................................392
D. Expertise.........................................................................395
III. HOW TO TAKE CREATIVITY SERIOUSLY ...................................... 398
A. Should Everything Be Creative? .........................................398
1. Production Problems................................................... 398
2. The Value of Validity ................................................... 402

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 184 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL108_BARTHOLOMEW_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

358

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

12/8/2021 10:26 PM

[VOL. 97:1

B. Doctrinal Fixes ................................................................406
1. Making Motivations Matter ......................................... 406
2. Avoiding the Art/Science Double Standard .............. 410
3. Embracing Expertise ................................................... 412
CONCLUSION........................................................................................ 415
INTRODUCTION

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (noting
that copyright and patent laws were “designed to protect originality or creativity”); Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that copyright law is
“intended to encourage the creativity of ‘Authors’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8));
Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2015) (“On
the standard account, copyright protections exist primarily in order to promote
creativity.”).
2 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
3 See id. at 345.
4 E.g., Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 669
n.7 (7th Cir. 1986); see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.01[B][1] (2019).
5 See Aaron X. Fellmeth, Uncreative Intellectual Property Law, 27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
51, 55 (2019); Brian L. Frye, Against Creativity, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 426, 427–28 (2017);
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 171–72 (2008);
Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 817, 848 (2010).
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What is copyright for? In contrast to some other areas of the law,
there is overwhelming agreement on this question. Copyright
protection is meant to foster creative expression. 1 Hence the settled
doctrine that a work must be “creative” to be eligible for copyright
protection. 2
The consensus that creativity is copyright’s raison d’être quickly
disintegrates when the conversation turns to defining that concept. In
1991, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed as a matter of constitutional
law that copyrightable works must manifest some “creative spark,” but
it provided scant guidance on how to discern that ineffable glimmer,
except to say that most works do possess it. 3 Lower courts have been
unable or unwilling to fill in the details. Ignoring information that
seems obviously germane to the creativity inquiry—authorial intent,
the work’s reception in the relevant artistic community, or the work’s
deviation from convention—courts effectively abandon the field
altogether, crediting a defendant’s actual or proposed reproduction of
a work as a dispositive testament to its creativity. 4 Seeing the depths to
which the creativity requirement has sunk, some call for abandoning it
altogether. 5
The main reason for the creativity criterion’s impoverishment is a
belief—indeed, a faith—in the almost magical quality of the creative
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process. So conceived, the creative process is wholly and necessarily
subjective, impervious to description or measurement by objective
criteria. A corollary position warns of aesthetic prejudice. Because
there are no objective benchmarks available to keep them honest,
judges and juries will lend an undesirable bias to any attempt to
rigorously evaluate artistic creativity, unfairly favoring some kinds of
artworks over others. As a result, creativity is mostly presumed rather
than proven in copyright cases.
Until recently, psychology offered little evidence to shake the legal
view that the creative process is unknowable. For a long time, the
discipline ignored creativity altogether. 6 When psychologists turned
to the subject in the mid-twentieth century, their method was usually
to interview select creative individuals, most of whom (quite
understandably) possessed limited ability to articulate the origins,
stimuli, and processes of their own artistic production. 7
This state of affairs has changed thanks to the techniques and
tools of neuroscience. The last decade witnessed an explosion of
neuroscientific research on creativity. 8 Inquiries into the biology of
creative thought, which now represent a large share of all
psychological studies of creativity, 9 bring new insights into the creative
process, insights that clash with the uninformed guesses of a century’s
worth of copyright jurisprudence. This Article examines these new
findings and takes seriously their implications for copyright law.
Surveying an exciting and productive decade of relevant
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6 Jack A. Chambers, Beginning a Multidimensional Theory of Creativity, 25 PSYCH. REPS.
779, 779 (1969) (“About the only thing agreed on [in the 1950s] was that creativity involved
the development of something unique.”).
7 Perhaps as a result, legal academics greeted attempts to leverage psychological
research in the service of a more specific creativity requirement with skepticism. See, e.g.,
Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 935 (2003) (criticizing the search
for some “appropriate psychological element” in evaluating the creativity requirement);
Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 1487, 1531 (2011) (doubting that courts should try to “dissect[] the internal processes
of the creative mind”); Marc K. Temin, The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist’s Wrong Turn and
the Scope of Copyright Protection for Factual Works, 111 PA. ST. L. REV. 263, 279 (2006) (calling
for an end “to fruitless discussions of the nature of . . . creativity”); Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking
Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 839 (1993) (“An adequate neurological explanation
[of creativity] is simply unavailable, given our present limited understanding of the
physiology of the cerebral cortex.”).
8 Mathias Benedek, Alexander P. Christensen, Andreas Fink & Roger E. Beaty,
Creativity Assessment in Neuroscience Research, 13 PSYCH. AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY & ARTS 218,
219 (2019) (estimating that seventy percent of all articles in this burgeoning field have been
published since 2010).
9 Rex E. Jung & Oshin Vartanian, Introduction, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY 1, 3 (Rex E. Jung & Oshin Vartanian eds., 2018) (calculating
that in 2015 neuroscientific studies comprised fifteen percent of all psychological studies of
creativity).
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10 But see Mark Bartholomew, Neuromarks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 521, 552–54 (2018)
(discussing use of neural evidence in individual trademark cases).
11 See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property:
Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS
AND COPYRIGHTS 19, 21–23 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986); Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
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neuroscientific research, it advocates replacing entrenched legal
misunderstandings with sounder and subtler descriptions of the
creative process.
What the research shows is that creative activity has certain
hallmarks—and that these hallmarks are disregarded in contemporary
copyright law. Neuroscience confirms that creative works are the
product of a particular process that involves lengthy planning,
deliberation, and focus. Yet copyright law blinds itself to information
on the creative process, judging creativity by exclusive reference to the
final product—the allegedly creative work itself—and repeatedly
insisting that even accidental and unconscious conduct can be
creative. All available psychological evidence finds that artistic
innovation demands a working knowledge of a relevant domain’s prior
art, but courts avoid comparing an artistic domain’s extant works to
the work at issue. Even though the science reveals that experts
recognize creative breakthroughs in the moment and agree in their
assessments of a work’s creativity, expert testimony is considered so
idiosyncratic as to be unreliable and unwelcome in copyright creativity
determinations.
By enhancing our understanding of the creative process,
neuroscience can offer guideposts for redefining copyright’s creativity
standard. It cannot provide a complete blueprint. Creative thought is
too complex a cognitive activity to be fully elucidated by today’s
technologies for recording changes in blood flow and measuring
fluctuations of electrical activity in the brain. Time and its passage
place another limit on neuroscience’s present utility to the law of
copyright and creativity. Neuroscientists study creative behaviors as
they happen in laboratory settings, but copyright disputes often involve
projects completed in the distant past. It is impossible to use neural
imaging to see what occurred in an author’s mind years before she
seeks to vindicate her intellectual property rights in court. 10 But the
point is not to use neuroscientific evidence to decide individual cases;
the point is to improve the doctrine governing those cases.
Even if neuroscience cannot be used to decide individual cases, it
does offer valuable insights for restructuring the creativity
requirement. For all the agreement around copyright’s intended
service to creative production, solid evidence of copyright law’s
incentive effects is notoriously hard to come by. 11 Neuroscience offers
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Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1573–76 (1993); Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based
Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1334–35 (2015).
12 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
13 See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 204 (2008); Joseph P. Fishman,
Originality’s Other Path, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 861, 863–65 (2021).
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lawmakers and legal theorists a promising alternative: redirect our
attention to the mental processes that generate artistic output in the
first place; then use our understanding of those processes to assess and
revise the legal rules meant to foster creativity. This Article instantiates
that alternative.
The Article begins by setting the current doctrinal scene. As Part
I explains, creativity and independent creation are copyright law’s two
conditions for originality, described as the “sine qua non of
copyright.” 12 Yet, as interpreted by the courts, the creativity condition
has become vanishingly small. This was not always the case. Not unlike
the exacting creativity requirement currently applied in the related
field of patent law, copyright’s creativity requirement once had some
real teeth. 13 It lost that bite through neither accident nor neglect, but
through the force of three assumptions about the creative process
grounded more in ideology than in fact. The first of these assumptions
holds that authorial intent is irrelevant because creativity is both an
inherently personal process, resistant to external appraisal, and a
quality that can manifest without personal volition. According to the
second assumption, artistry, unlike the inventive output regulated by
patent law, does not rely on domain-specific expertise and, therefore,
should not be compared against previous work in the same domain.
Finally, the third assumption maintains that attempts to evaluate
creativity can only enact the evaluator’s personal taste, leading courts
to reject expert evidence of an author’s relationship to her particular
artistic domain. The end result of these assumptions is a creativity filter
that allows almost everything to pass through.
Part II shows how the major assumptions of copyright’s creativity
jurisprudence have been upended by the latest evidence on how the
creative process actually works. Psychologists posit that creativity
occurs in systems involving not only (1) the individual artist, but (2)
the techniques and conventions of the relevant domain (e.g., hip-hop
music or comic books), as well as (3) the reactions of that domain’s
gatekeepers and trusted authorities. Neuroscience has uncovered
important dimensions of these three essential variables: individual,
domain, and field. For the individual author, we know that intent is
key. Rather than being irrelevant, motivation is highly correlated with
creative success: to generate something creative, you need to want to
generate something creative. With respect to domain, understanding
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what came before is critical because creativity depends on evaluating
new concepts against a benchmark of existing standards. Lastly, as to
field, experts offer more than their personal tastes; they can
consistently detect and appreciate creative activity in a way that
individuals with less experience in the relevant domain cannot.
Part III turns from the descriptive to the normative, detailing how
the creativity requirement should be recalibrated in light of recent
neuroscientific discoveries. A handful of legal scholars argue for the
requirement’s complete abolishment, but a meaningful creativity
standard supplies critical benefits. It can help fulfill copyright’s
constitutional mission of furthering innovation in science and the arts
as well as improve the structure and sequencing of judicial decision
making in copyright adjudications. To realize these benefits, however,
courts’ application of the creativity requirement must change. Three
doctrinal reforms—investigating artistic motivation, considering prior
art, and receiving expert testimony as to a work’s departures from what
came before—are proposed.
I.

CREATIVITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
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14 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is a
fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativity.”); Abraham Drassinower, A
Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain in Copyright Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1869, 1869 (2011) (“The idea that the purpose of copyright law is to provide incentives for
creativity is among the most fundamental and most established ideas in North American
copyright discourse.”).
15 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
16 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright
Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike.”);
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29
(2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]he pertinent purpose of the copyright laws” is “to encourage
the production of creative works by according authors a property right in their works”).
17 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2020)
(“[C]ourts, scholars, and legislators identify copyright’s primary purpose as the inducement
of creativity.”); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1151, 1192 (2007) (“No one wants to be against creativity, and if copyright equals
creativity then no one wants to be against copyright.”).
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The creativity requirement represents a massive paradox at the
heart of copyright law. On the one hand, statements as to the centrality
of creativity to copyright protection are omnipresent. 14 According to
the U.S. Supreme Court, the “ultimate aim” of copyright law is “to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” 15 Hearing this
message, lower courts repeatedly describe the promotion of creativity
as copyright law’s guiding purpose. 16 In alignment with the courts,
most theoretical examinations of copyright contend that its primary
mission is to promote creativity. 17 To this end, the law requires every
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copyrightable work to be “original,” and every work must demonstrate
creativity in order to be considered original.18
On the other hand, for all its supposed importance, the creativity
requirement is a paper tiger. To say that the creativity requirement is
modest would be an understatement. In officially proclaiming a
creativity threshold for copyright protection, the Supreme Court only
announced that the work must “entail a minimal degree of
creativity.” 19 “To be sure,” the Court went on to note, “the requisite
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess
some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it
might be.” 20 The creativity requirement is rarely used to deny a
plaintiff’s claim of copyright infringement. 21
Why has the creativity requirement fallen into this paradox? Why
not raise the creativity bar, as some legal scholars have suggested, so
that it is doing work to actually incentivize authors? 22 Alternatively, if
the current creativity requirement does little to no work, why not
jettison it altogether? 23
The reasons why these paths to resolving the paradox have not
been taken have to do with judicial understandings of the nature of
creativity itself. Judges believe artistic creativity is incapable of
measurement. Part of this insistence on creativity’s ineffable nature
stems from an assumption that the creative process is necessarily
subjective, preventing efforts to measure expressive attempts against
some kind of external benchmark.24 Relatedly, there is a belief that
moments of artistic ideation occur suddenly and often subconsciously,
rendering questions of motivation or intent inapplicable to the
creativity calculus. 25
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18 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The other
requirement of originality is that the work must be independently created by the author,
i.e., not simply copied from other works. Id.
19 Id. at 348.
20 Id. at 345 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (2019)).
21 See infra Section I.A.
22 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in
Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 867–79 (2004); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality,
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 485–94 (2009); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality,
95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1523–42 (2009); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 884 (2007) (recommending a heightened creativity standard for
works to earn special moral rights protections).
23 See sources cited supra note 5.
24 See infra Section I.C.
25 See infra Section I.B.
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Despite these beliefs, judges cannot abandon the creativity
requirement altogether. According to the Supreme Court, the text of
the Constitution mandates some form of creativity prerequisite for
copyright protection. 26 In addition, copyright’s take on creativity is
sometimes lauded for its democratic posture. By maintaining a
minimal eligibility threshold that equates mere personality with
creativity, copyright law manages to avoid charges of elitism and
celebrate everyone’s creative potential. 27
The end result of these suppositions about the creative process is
a vague, all-access definition of creativity that does no work when it
comes to the incentives of authors and artists. The rest of this Part
describes the current operation of the creativity requirement as well as
the assumptions behind that requirement in more detail. Part II
examines how these assumptions actually match the latest
neuroscientific discoveries involving creative thought.
A. “Substantively Impotent” Test

C M
Y K
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26 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (“As a
constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that
possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.”).
27 See infra Section I.D.
28 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46, 362.
29 See, e.g., Luck’s Music Libr., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 2004)
(citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 346), aff’d, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
30 One court reversed a lower court for denying copyright in a set of management
training workbooks that the lower court considered “aggressively vapid” and filled with only
“platitudinal business speak.” See Situation Mgmt. Sys. v. ASP Consulting Grp., 535 F. Supp.
2d 231, 239, 241 (D. Mass. 2008), vacated and remanded sub nom. Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc.
v. ASP. Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
31 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951)
(“Having hit upon . . . a variation unintentionally, the ‘author’ may adopt it as his and
copyright it.”); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 187 Side B

Ill-defined, the creativity requirement for copyright protection
remains inchoate, anchored only by words and phrases describing just
how skimpy this requirement is. In announcing a formal creativity
requirement in 1991, the Supreme Court used terms like “minimal,”
“low,” “slight,” and “modicum.” 28 According to another court, “just a
scintilla of creativity” will do. 29
The creativity requirement is rarely used to deny a plaintiff’s claim
of copyright infringement. Courts do their best to avoid any scrutiny
of the requirement, hastily determining that the bare minimum of
needed imagination exists and then moving on to other legal issues.
Rather than putting any teeth into the requirement, judges award
copyright protection to works that are entirely conventional, 30 as well
as ones that are completely accidental. 31 It is hard to argue to that the
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(deeming recording of Kennedy assassination sufficiently creative even if there was no
indication that the camera operator planned for or anticipated that his camera would
record the images that it did).
32 Madison, supra note 5, at 830.
33 Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 31 (1983).
34 Karjala, supra note 5, at 171. For an argument that even if the minimalist creativity
requirement does little to actually restrict what can be copyrighted, it communicates a
salutary respect for the personal nature of artistic expression, see Jeanne C. Fromer,
Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1807–10 (2012).
35 Santrayll v. Burrell, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1052, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Tin Pan
Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1791, 1794 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding rap
song lyrics “Hugga-Hugga” and “Brrr” sufficiently creative).
36 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2004).
37 Id.
38 See id. at 850.
39 ABS Ent., Inc. v. CBS Corp., 908 F.3d 405, 422 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
40 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
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requirement is furthering copyright law’s ultimate goal of spurring
artistic creativity when its application in actual cases represents the
kind of test that everyone passes. Scholars describe the creativity
requirement as “substantively impotent,” 32 “uncertain and
confused,” 33 and playing “little or no useful role in copyright
analysis.”34
Courts go to great lengths to avoid denying copyright protection
to a work for lack of creativity. Less than inspired song lyrics, like
repetition of the phrase “uh-oh,” have been considered sufficiently
creative. 35 Even when elements of a work are identical to another
work, judges take pains to downplay glaring similarities that augur
against creativity. When pop diva Mariah Carey was accused of
infringing another artist’s song, Carey maintained the other artist’s
song was insufficiently creative to enjoy copyright protection. 36 In
support, she noted that a seven-note sequence in the first measure of
the song was identical to the first measure of the folk song “For He’s a
Jolly Good Fellow.”37 The Ninth Circuit rejected Carey’s argument,
reasoning that the first measure could be creative in the musical genre
of R&B even if it was uncreative in folk music.38
This is not to say that the creativity requirement can never
influence the outcome of a copyright case. There is a certain zone
where someone’s attempt to create is not creative enough to warrant
copyright protection—otherwise the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of a creativity requirement would be fatuous. But this zone only
occupies the “narrowest and most obvious limits.”39 Most famously, in
the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Supreme Court denied copyright protection for a telephone directory
listing names, addresses, and phone numbers by alphabetical order.40
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“[T]here is nothing remotely creative about arranging names
alphabetically in a white pages directory,” the Court explained. 41
Copyright has also been denied for lack of creativity for random
number generation, 42 a single sentence posted to a listserv, 43 and a
chart listing horse racing statistics in a functional grid. 44
Yet such cases are the exceptions that prove the rule. Only in
situations where it is difficult to discern any degree of choice or
selection in the plaintiff’s work is there the possibility for a judgment
that creativity is lacking. 45 In Feist, the Court deemed the alphabetical
ordering of names insufficiently creative because such ordering was
“universally observed,” “so commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course,” and “practically inevitable.” 46
Likewise, the terse listserv post asking about an accounting firm’s
billing practices and the grid listing dates and betting amounts for
horse races arguably had few ways to be alternately composed.47
Creativity surely means more than making a choice between two
options. In the popular imagination, creativity refers to acts of
extraordinary talent. 48 For their part, courts use phrases like “creative
judgment[],” 49 “intellectual conception,” 50 “intellectual invention,”51
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41 Id.
42 Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1374 (10th Cir. 1997).
43 Stern v. Does, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Stern v.
Weinstein, 512 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2013).
44 Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991).
45 See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:39 (2021), Westlaw PATRYCOPY;
compare Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs. Inc., 893 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th
Cir. 2018) (holding compilation of names and addresses in commercial database
sufficiently creative because “Experian’s employees choose from multiple and sometimes
conflicting sources, and they use their judgment in selecting which names and addresses to
include in the database”), with ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions
& Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying copyright for auto parts numbers
when “there is only one reasonable way to express the underlying idea”).
46 Feist, 499 U.S. at 363.
47 Stern, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 1042–43 (rejecting poster’s argument that post could have
been written in different ways); Victor Lalli Enters., 936 F.2d at 673 (“[H]e arranges factual
data according to ‘purely functional grids that offer no opportunity for variation.’”).
Copyright was denied for random number generation because it was “arbitrary,” i.e., it
involved no selection at all. See Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1373–74.
48 Phillip McIntyre, Creativity and Cultural Production: A Study of Contemporary Western
Popular Music Songwriting, 20 CREATIVITY RSCH. J. 40, 40 (2008). Psychologists largely agree
on a similar definition of creativity as requiring something that is new and appropriate to
the circumstances. See Dean Keith Simonton, Taking the U.S. Patent Office Criteria Seriously:
A Quantitative Three-Criterion Creativity Definition and Its Implications, 24 CREATIVITY RSCH. J.
97, 97 (2012).
49 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
50 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
51 Id. at 60.
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“true artistic skill,” 52 and “intellectual production” 53 to describe
creativity. At the same time, however, they are extremely generous in
considering works that are the product of very few intellectual choices
as creative. Seemingly uncreative works—from an exact miniature
copy of an existing sculpture 54 to a standardized test answer sheet55 to
instruction manuals 56 to the use of arrows and placement of text in a
catalog to highlight particular products 57—are routinely deemed
sufficiently creative.
Moreover, once one closely examines the few cases where the
quantum of creativity has been deemed insufficient, it becomes clear
that many of these cases rely heavily on a different part of copyright
doctrine: the idea/expression dichotomy. Copyright law prohibits the
protection of ideas; only the expression of those ideas is subject to
copyright. 58 If an idea can be expressed in only one or just a few ways,
then even the expression may not be copyrighted.59
Cases involving words and short phrases illustrate how it is often
the dichotomy and not the creativity requirement that is relied on to
deny copyright protection. It is black-letter law that copyright in
individual words and short phrases is prohibited. 60 Sometimes the
prohibition is justified by reference to the creativity requirement. For
example, an attempt to assert copyright in envelopes printed with
phrases like “TELEGRAM,” “GIFT CHECK,” and “PRIORITY
MESSAGE” was rebuffed for lacking “the minimal degree of creativity
necessary.”61 Similar reasoning prevented copyright in the listserv post
mentioned above.62 But a closer look reveals that, despite the mention
of creativity, these cases were actually decided on the grounds that the
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52 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).
53 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (quoting BurrowGiles, 111 U.S. at 60).
54 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
55 Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 523–24
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
56 Eagle Servs. Corp. v. H2O Indus. Servs., Inc., 532 F.3d 620, 622–23 (7th Cir. 2008).
57 Decker Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 734, 743 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
58 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea . . . .”); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
59 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
60 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2020).
61 Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 772 (W.D.
Pa. 1986).
62 Stern v. Does, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that the listserv
post “displays no creativity whatsoever”), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Weinstein, 512 F. App’x 701
(9th Cir. 2013).
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brief expressions at issue could not be separated from the idea they
conveyed. 63
The point here is that a large portion of the few cases denying
protection for lack of creativity can be more adequately described as
cases invoking the bar against copyright in ideas. 64 This leaves a very
small number of cases that truly withhold copyright protection due to
lack of creativity, testifying to the modern creativity requirement’s
toothless nature. If you can only find a handful of cases denying
copyright protection for lack of creativity despite the existence of some
sort of creativity requirement for over a century, 65 and many of those
cases actually depend on an area of copyright doctrine separate from
the creativity requirement, then the creativity requirement is hardly
worth describing as a requirement at all.
B. Art and the Subjective
Courts have adopted this minimalist conception of the creativity
requirement out of a belief that creativity is impossible to measure. 66
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63 See id. (“Plaintiff merely requested factual information: whether anyone on the
listserv had a bad experience with a certain forensic accounting firm—and one employee
in particular—regarding overbilling and the churning of client files. His single sentence
conveys precisely this idea and no more. As Plaintiff’s expression of his idea is
indistinguishable from the idea itself, it is not entitled to copyright protection.”); Magic
Mktg., 634 F. Supp. at 772 (“[C]lichéd language and expressions communicating an idea
which may only be conveyed in a more or less stereotyped manner are not copyrightable.”).
At other times, courts explicitly cite the idea/expression dichotomy and not the creativity
requirement to deny protection to short phrases. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492
F.3d 1377, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2007); N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v.
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 527, 541–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 497 F.3d
109 (2d Cir. 2007); Perma Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 598 F. Supp. 445, 448–49
(E.D. Mo. 1984).
64 Equating brevity with a lack of creativity does not always make sense. It can take
real intellectual conception to come up with a catchy headline or poignant sentence. JANE
C. GINSBURG & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 21 (2012) (“A short phrase may in
fact be very creative . . . .”); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 578 (2005) (“[I]t is fundamentally disingenuous to use the
originality requirement as the doctrinal bar against copyright protection of titles, names,
and short phrases. Many very small expressions positively leap over the low threshold of
originality we have established in copyright law.”).
65 See infra note 71.
66 Copyright scholarship offers an additional justification for the minimal nature of
the creativity requirement. Paul Goldstein argues that copyright’s goal is to produce
“abundant information,” which makes a restrictive creativity requirement undesirable.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1.1 (3d ed. 2021), Westlaw GOLDCOPY.
He contrasts copyright’s low creativity threshold with patent law’s stricter eligibility
requirements, which are geared to efficiency and innovation as opposed to sheer
abundance. Id. It is unclear, however, why progress should be evaluated quantitatively for
artistic works and qualitatively for scientific works. There is such a thing as diminishing
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If the creative process is unavoidably subjective, understandable only
to the artist herself and perhaps not even to her, then the courts should
avoid tying the creativity requirement to evidence of authorial
intention. Instead of interrogating a question for which there is no
probative evidence, courts should simply presume creativity in all but
the rarest of cases.
This view is best represented by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
influential majority opinion in the case of Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co. 67 The 1903 case, which involved the copyrightability
of poster art advertising a traveling circus, 68 sets an extremely low bar
for satisfying the originality requirement and an extremely generous
view of human creativity. As described by Justice Holmes, the creative
process is natural, inevitable, and found in everyone: “Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man’s alone.” 69
This is a far different description of creative thought than the one
in the popular imagination. Most people consider something creative
by virtue of its statistical infrequency. 70 Yet Justice Holmes rejected the
popular definition for the courts, at least in part, because creativity is
so difficult to evaluate. His description of creativity as inherently
personal signaled a belief that creativity is not susceptible to outside
measurement. Because artistic works cannot be judged in any
objective fashion, copyright law had to impose a subjective standard of
originality. 71
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returns from high numbers of expressive works. See MARTIN SKLADANY, BIG COPYRIGHT
VERSUS THE PEOPLE 3 (2018). For more on the constitutional and prudential concerns with
the quantitative view, see infra subsection III.A.1.
67 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
68 Id. at 248.
69 Id. at 250.
70 See Naama Mayseless, Ayelet Eran & Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory, Generating Original
Ideas: The Neural Underpinning of Originality, 116 NEUROIMAGE 232, 232 (2015).
71 With its assertion that almost any work that was not an identical copy of another
was deserving of copyright protection, Bleistein marked a departure from previous cases
evaluating copyrightability. Earlier decisions had already staked out an originality
requirement, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographic Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STORIES 77, 96 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006)
(“Originality as a constitutional requirement for copyright was not born in Bleistein.”), but
this requirement demanded some ingenuity on the part of the author. A decade earlier,
before Justice Holmes’s arrival, the Supreme Court denied copyright to product labels,
explaining that a work had to be “founded in the creative powers of the mind” to enjoy
protection. Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 94 (1879)). Likewise, lower courts in this earlier era required something more for
the originality requirement than the “personality” found in mere handwriting. E.g.,
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Bleistein and its progeny insist that creativity is subjective. One
might assume that this stance would have led courts to examine the
artist’s own mindset for evidence of creativity. Even if the court’s
measurement of a work’s creativity against some objective scale is
improper, consideration of the artist’s own subjective beliefs during
the creative process might help provide at least some data for the
creativity assessment courts must engage in under Feist. If someone
sets out to be creative, maybe it is more likely that they will succeed in
being creative.
We see such analyses in other legal regimes. Scrutiny of mental
state is a central component of many if not most areas of the law, from
determining mens rea for different crimes to looking for the presence
or absence of a particular state of mind in tort law (e.g., actual malice
in a defamation case). In trademark law, consideration of the
defendant’s intent helps determine the central issue in the
infringement analysis: likelihood of confusion. Even though the
defendant’s mental state seems somewhat orthogonal to the main issue
of whether consumers are likely to be confused by the defendant’s
activities, courts reason that evidence of a desire to confuse correlates
strongly enough with success at confusing people to make such
evidence highly probative. 72 Several areas of copyright law, outside of
the evaluation of creativity, take pains to scrutinize the motivations of
the parties. 73
Despite all of these areas of willingness to consider evidence of
mental state, copyright doctrine insists that any inquiry into the
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Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 100 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (granting copyright in a beer
advertisement because the work had “obvious artistic qualities” and was “a work of the
imagination”); see also Bracha, supra note 13, at 204 (describing a “strand of originality
cases” in the 1800s that “not only recognized an originality requirement, but also showed
willingness to fill it with meaningful content”). Bleistein rejected these earlier precedents,
shifting the originality requirement from an active gatekeeper for what was eligible for
copyright to a porous filter that catches almost nothing in its net.
72 See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23:124 (5th ed. 2021), Westlaw MCCARTHY (“[I]t is not often that a business person
intentionally sets out to divert sales from a competitor by confusing customers, yet is so
inept that it fails to achieve its goal.”).
73 A finding that a defendant intended a design feature to avoid an infringement
claim is construed as strong evidence that two works are not substantially similar. See, e.g.,
Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435, 1444 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). A defendant may
be accused of bad faith and, hence, undeserving of copyright’s fair use defense, if he
intended to deprive the plaintiff of the value of her copyright. See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v.
Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478–79 (2d Cir. 2004). The plaintiff’s mental state can also be
relevant for determining ownership of a copyrightable work. To be joint authors, the
parties must have intended to be joint authors. See, e.g., Foster v. Lee, 93 F. Supp. 3d 223,
228 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]he authors must ‘entertain in their minds the concept of joint
authorship.’” (quoting Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991))).
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74 See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.06, at 63 (6th ed.
2014) (“[S]o long as the work contains the required original elements, courts will not look
to the intended purpose of the work or the audience to whom it is directed.”).
75 Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 n.4 (2d Cir. 1945).
76 Id.
77 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
78 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 74 F. Supp. 973, 974–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1947),
aff’d, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
79 Id. at 975.
80 Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 103 (quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer
Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
81 Id. at 104–05.
82 Id. at 105.
83 Id. at 105 n.25.
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motivations of an author is improper when evaluating originality.74
Objections to such inquiries are longstanding. In 1945, Judge Jerome
Frank sounded the alarm against using a would-be author’s intentions
to determine if his changes to an existing work were sufficient to be
considered original. Like Justice Holmes, Judge Frank’s objection
stemmed from concerns over the inability of outsiders to understand
the creative process. “It is not easy to ascertain what is intended and
what [is] inadvertent in the work of genius,” he explained. 75 “That a
man is color-blind may make him a master of black and white art; a
painter’s unique distortions, hailed as a sign of his genius, may be due
to defective muscles.”76
Six years later, Judge Frank reaffirmed his position in the case of
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 77 In that case, the plaintiff
asserted copyright in mezzotint engravings of paintings from the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 78 Mezzotinting involves
using a roughened metal plate to make a print of another work. 79
Judge Frank deemed the engraved reproductions copyrightable,
explaining that originality “means little more than a prohibition of
actual copying.” 80 Even though the plaintiff’s avowed goal was to
reproduce the original paintings as accurately as possible, because the
mezzotinting process could not produce perfect replicas, the plaintiff
could not be accused of “actual copying.” 81 The fact that the subtle
changes and imperfections in the mezzotinted works the plaintiff
sought to protect were unintentional did not matter to Judge Frank.
“[E]ven if their substantial departures from the paintings were
inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid,” he explained. 82 Judge
Frank even speculated that mistakes made when translating a literary
work from one language to another would similarly be eligible for
copyright protection. 83
Judge Frank’s call to ignore consideration of artist motivations
echoes throughout more modern cases.
In a case involving
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promotional photographs taken of copyrighted toys, the holder of
copyrights in the toys maintained that because the photographer
intended the photos for the “‘purely utilitarian function’ of identifying
products for consumers,” the photographs were ineligible for
copyright protection. 84 The court rejected this argument, explaining
that the “purpose of the photographs” was irrelevant to the originality
analysis. 85 For another court analyzing the copyrightability of
photographs of automobile transmission parts for a catalog, it did not
matter how the plaintiff thought about its design process or that it
embarked on its catalog project with no creative conception in mind. 86
This discounting of the importance of artistic mindset can be found in
the frequent incantation in modern copyright decisions that it is the
ultimate product that matters for the creativity requirement, not the
process that led to that product. 87
The assumption that creativity is detached from motivation
reaches its apotheosis in judicial discussion of works that are the
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84 See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Brief for Appellee at 37, Schrock, 586 F.3d 513 (No. 08-1296)).
85 Id. (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903);
SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also
FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 324 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251) (noting that commercial motivation for creation of
images “has no bearing on their copyrightability”).
86 See Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc. v. Cap. Core, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-72,
2013 WL 12178585, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013). Examinations of authorial intent have
not been favored by scholars discussing the creativity requirement either. Some reason that
because copyright infringement is a strict liability offense, authorial intentions should be
irrelevant in determining originality. See Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s
Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1102, 1161–62 (2017) (“It seems inconsistent with
existing copyright law to place significant weight on intent during creation.”); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1001 (1990); Russ VerSteeg, Intent,
Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 123, 132–33 (2002) (arguing
that intent of author should not be dispositive in determining originality).
87 ABS Ent., Inc. v. CBS Corp., 908 F.3d 405, 419 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he process used
to create the derivative work is seldom informative of originality in the copyright sense.”);
Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“[I]n assessing the originality of a work for which copyright protection is sought, we look
only at the final product, not the process . . . .”); Situation Mgmt. Sys. v. ASP Consulting Grp.,
535 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241 (D. Mass. 2008) (“That a particular design was the product of a
creative choice does not render the design copyrightable; rather, the focus of the inquiry
remains whether the ultimate product of that choice is entitled to protection.”), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP. Consulting LLC, 560
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Cruz v. Cox Media Grp., 444 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465–66
(E.D.N.Y. 2020) (suggesting that authorial purpose is irrelevant in photography cases);
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 2012 (2006) (“Historically, the discourse on authors’ rights
in the United States has emphasized the externalized product of creativity at the expense
of the underlying process.”).
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product of accident. There would seem to be no need to grant
copyright protection to accidental creations under the incentive
theory. After all, an author or artist who creates inadvertently cannot
be said to have been incentivized by the law. Given that copyright
protection imposes costs on downstream actors by blocking them from
using someone else’s copyrighted materials, a strong argument can be
made for excluding accidental creations from the benefits of copyright
protection.
Nevertheless, the law is quite clear that accidental works of art not
only satisfy the creativity requirement, but they receive just as much
protection and benefit as works that were the conscious products of
artistic genius. In Alfred Bell, Judge Frank shared a story from the
ancient Greek philosopher Plutarch. According to the story, “A
painter, enraged because he could not depict the foam that filled a
horse’s mouth from champing at the bit, threw a sponge at his
painting; the sponge splashed against the wall—and achieved the
desired result.” 88 The implication of the story seems to be that artistic
products of accident are just as deserving of copyright as any other
work eligible for copyright protection. In accord, courts today
routinely mention that copyright protection applies to accidental steps
and unconscious choices. 89 As the leading copyright treatise explains,
“The independent effort that constitutes originality may be
inadvertent and still satisfy the requirements of copyright.” 90
C. Creativity Without Context
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88 Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 105 n.23.
89 E.g., Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1268 (emphasizing that copyright applies to “the
accidental or spontaneous artist”). This is not to say that other varieties of intellectual
property law deny protection for all somewhat inadvertently successful outputs. See generally
Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009). But the willingness to recognize
and reward unintentional creations with no other action from the rights holder is unique
to copyright law. See, e.g., Bentley v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 359 F.2d 140, 145 (9th
Cir. 1966) (“Where the ‘design’ of a design patent is dictated primarily by functional or
mechanical requirements and any pleasing aesthetic effect is only an inadvertent byproduct, the design patent is invalid.”).
90 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01[B][1].
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At the same time that the creativity requirement eschews
subjective inquiry into authorial motives, it also refuses to objectively
scrutinize the author’s creative capabilities. Courts rarely examine
what came before in the relevant artistic arena to probe a work’s
innovative force. Instead, only the work at issue is scrutinized with little
to no attention to its predecessors. Just as the mantra of “product, not
process” allows courts to ignore evidence of artist motivation (or lack

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 192 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL108_BARTHOLOMEW_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

374

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

12/8/2021 10:26 PM

[VOL. 97:1

thereof), there is an accompanying focus on “product, not
predecessors” that limits consideration of relevant prior art.91
Take the Third Circuit’s decision to reverse both the Copyright
Office as well as the court below to award copyright in “a rectangular
object having a stone-like appearance and a verse inscribed on the
face.” 92 Even though the verse was copied word for word from the
public domain, the court of appeals deemed the object original, giving
the author creative credit for presenting the verse in a particular font
and capitalizing the first letter of each word. 93 The court offered no
comparison to other garden sculptures or sculptures in general to
support its decision that the author had added “her own imaginative
spark” to the work.94
Copyright law’s refusal to consider prior art in evaluating
creativity stands in sharp contrast to the related field of patent law.
Patent law has its own threshold requirements for protection that
implicate creativity, most importantly a requirement that a patentable
invention cannot be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the
pertinent art. 95 In determining the contours of nonobviousness, courts
often refer to the necessity of assessing inventive creativity. 96 Unlike
their investigation of copyright matters, courts insist that the
nonobviousness standard demands objective evaluation, tethering the
requirement to various information about other works in the relevant
domain. 97 To meet patent law’s creativity threshold, the inventor must
distinguish herself from what has come before.
The difference in judicial willingness to assess artistic versus
scientific creativity is intentional. It stems from the assumption that
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91 Analysis of prior art is sometimes undertaken in evaluating a separate requirement
for copyright eligibility: independent creation. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens,
Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he district court reasonably concluded that the
prior usage of the saying was sufficiently widespread as to make it exceedingly unlikely . . .
that [the plaintiff] had, in fact, independently created the phrase.”).
92 See Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2005).
93 Id. at 202, 207.
94 See id. at 207; see also, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133,
134–35 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing district court holding that face, lips, and eyes of Barbie
doll were so common as to be uncopyrightable: “The proposition that standard or common
features are not protected is inconsistent with copyright law”).
95 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966).
96 For example, the Federal Circuit explains that nonobviousness requires the
exercise of more than “ordinary creativity.” See Intercontinental Great Brands LLC v.
Kellogg N. Am. Co., 869 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
97 The scope and content of relevant prior art, the level of ordinary skill in the prior
art, the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, and the invention’s
role in resolving long felt but unsolved needs are all part of the nonobviousness inquiry.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 192 Side B



43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 193 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL108_BARTHOLOMEW_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

COPYRIGHT AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS

12/8/2021 10:26 PM

375

scientific creativity is calculable while artistic creativity is not. 98 Even
Justice Holmes was relatively sanguine about the ability of judges to
assess the creativity of scientists and inventors; it was artistic creativity
that he believed unsuited to objective comparisons. 99
Today’s creativity analyses often include cautionary language
about how a work’s “aesthetic or educational value is not readily
apparent to a person trained in the law.” 100 Noting that “judges can
make fools of themselves pronouncing on aesthetic matters,” Judge
Richard Posner took pains to describe “artistic originality” as a
particular kind of question that judges could not assess. 101 “Artistic
originality indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too
small to be apprehended by a judge,” he said. 102
If a judge strays by comparing a work to the relevant prior art and
finding insufficient difference, she is reprimanded. When a federal
district court departed from the norm and determined that a
photograph of a Skyy vodka bottle against a plain white background
lacked adequate creativity, it was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. 103 The
district court compared the photograph to the original bottle, finding
the photograph insufficiently creative because any differences between
the original bottle and the version in the photograph would be
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98 Courts are aware of the divergence between patent and copyright when it comes to
creative standards. See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d
663, 668 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102
(2d Cir. 1951). Hence, unlike other areas of difference between the two intellectual
property regimes, one cannot describe this schism as inadvertent or unexamined. See Mark
Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 84–86 (2013) (describing path-dependent treatment of exceptions
for free expression in different intellectual property regimes).
99 See Amelia Smith Rinehart, Holmes on Patents: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love Patent Law, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 896, 909 (2016). As Barton Beebe has
chronicled, Justice Holmes was not alone in believing that aesthetic efforts, in contrast to
functional ones, were not susceptible to measurement or reason. Beebe shows that this
belief that “one simply could not reason about the aesthetic” can be traced back to the
Founding Era. Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of
American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 340–41 (2017).
100 Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669 n.7.
101 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983).
102 Id.; see also George S. Chen Corp. v. Cadona Int’l, Inc., 266 F. App’x 523, 526 (9th
Cir. 2008) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Copyright Act does not allow copyright
registrations to be invalidated on nothing more than a failure to conform to a particular
judge’s idiosyncratic notions of creativity.”). Copyright scholarship makes similar claims
about the inability to measure artistic creativity. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of
Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1085–88 (2003); Clarisa
Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 488 (2004).
103 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., No. C 96-3690, 1998 WL 690856 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 28,
1998), rev’d, 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
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undetectable to a jury. 104 Rather than approving the district court’s
comparison of the photograph against the most important item of
prior art—the bottle itself—the Ninth Circuit faulted the district court
for ignoring precedent simply holding that almost any photograph is
per se creative. 105 Another federal appellate court criticized the court
below for comparing the work at issue (workplace training materials)
to similar informational works and finding the content to be “obvious”
and merely “common-sense.” 106 “[A] work’s entitlement to copyright
protection does not depend in any way upon the court’s subjective
assessment of its creative worth,” it chastised. 107
D. Copyright Populism
By defining creativity synonymously with personality, courts
hearing copyright cases enact an egalitarian vision of the creative
process.
Under the current definition, described by many
commentators as “democratic,” 108 admission to the society of copyright
holders is not a meritocracy. 109 In fact, thanks to the lackadaisical
approach to creativity, copyright may be the easiest of all property
rights to legally acquire. 110
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104 Id. at *7.
105 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1077.
106 Situation Mgmt. Sys. v. ASP Consulting Grp., 535 F. Supp. 2d 231, 239–41 (D. Mass.
2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP.
Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
107 Situation Mgmt. Sys., 560 F.3d at 60 (first citing Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); and then citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
108 E.g., Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent
Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 6 (describing Bleistein as a “democratizing
recalibration”); Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 569, 617 (2002) (applauding Alfred Bell’s “‘democratized,’ nonjudgmental
approach” (quoting Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 485 (1991))); Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar,
79 IOWA L. REV. 367, 370 n.13 (1994) (describing Bleistein as “a sweeping democratization
of the concept of art”); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as Art,
Photograph as Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 369 (2012) (“Bleistein provided American
law with an originality threshold low enough that all can enter, giving us a deeply
egalitarian, democratic copyright law that has neither place nor need for the creative
genius.”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1241
(1998) (asserting that Bleistein’s “[e]schewing any criterion of value except what people are
prepared to pay . . . . has the appeal of the democratic.”).
109 See Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2013 (2011) (“To the extent that
potential creators are aware of copyright’s minimalist creativity standard, the copyright
reward will be viewed more as simply providing a reward for task performance.”).
110 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 22, at 1509–10.
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Because the law is so accepting of everyone’s creative potential,
expertise is not particularly favored or recognized when applying the
creativity standard. Evidence of the author’s skill or training in the art
are ignored. 111 Contrasting authors with inventors, a late nineteenthcentury court explained that the latter term implies the use of more
than “only ordinary skill” whereas the former requires little skill as
evidenced by the “multitude of books [that] rest safely under
copyright.” 112 More modern decisions hold that the amateur status of
photographers and videographers is no barrier to passing the creativity
threshold. 113 After the Feist decision instructed that mere “sweat of the
brow” does not render something creative, 114 courts took pains to
emphasize that the author’s skill in the art did not impact their
creativity determinations. 115
The substitute for undemocratically taking into account
individual authorial capabilities in the creativity analysis is to rely on
market forces. Rather than privileging some personal expressions over
others, on its face, the current requirement is equally generous to
professionals and amateurs. If someone had the financial motive to
replicate your work, that is proof enough that your work is creative.
The leading treatise on copyright maintains that if someone copies off
you, it must mean that what you did was creative: “[O]ne may initially
posit that, if any author’s independent efforts contain sufficient skill to
motivate another’s copying, there is ipso facto a sufficient quantum of
originality to support a copyright.” 116 Along the same lines, the
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111 See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976); Decker
Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (stating that “mere
demonstration of physical skill or special training is insufficient for copyright protection”).
Patent law takes the opposite approach, considering the educational level of the inventor
in evaluating whether the inventive activity would have been obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the relevant art. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
112 Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 764 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894). The court listed
various lowbrow works found to enjoy copyright, including a dramatic scene of someone
being rescued from a speeding train and a comic song called “Slap, Bang, Here We Are
Again!” to show that “the courts have not undertaken . . . to measure carefully the degree
of originality, or literary skill[,] or training involved.” See id.
113 See Cruz v. Cox Media Grp., 444 F. Supp. 3d 457, 462, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); Time
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 142–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
114 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991).
115 See, e.g., ABS Ent., Inc. v. CBS Corp., 908 F.3d 405, 419 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The
remastering engineer’s application of ‘intensive, skillful, and even creative labor . . . does
not guarantee its copyrightability.’” (quoting Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A.,
Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008))); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d
772, 789 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[N]o amount of time, labor, skill, and money can bestow
copyright eligibility on a work that is devoid of creativity.”).
116 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01.
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Bleistein decision instructs that originality of a combination of
expressive elements “is sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce
them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights.”117 More modern courts
adopt the same logic. For example, the label on Pledge furniture
polish was deemed copyrightable because a rival polish manufacturer
intentionally used a similar label. 118 We can see how this approach is
in keeping with the democratic view of the creativity requirement. By
judging creativity only through the economic incentives of others to
copy, courts appear to maintain their aesthetic neutrality.
If expertise makes one no more likely to be creative, it also makes
one no more capable of assessing creativity in others. In Bleistein,
Justice Holmes bolstered the case for a minimalist creativity standard
with a closing prudential argument that still shapes the contours of
copyright law over a century later. He maintained that even if a court
were somehow capable of assessing creativity, the dangers of aesthetic
discrimination were not worth the risk:

Because the twin mysteries of artistic genius and mass appeal must
always remain somewhat opaque to judges, the argument goes, it is
better to simply allow all but the most egregious copyists to claim the
“creative” mantle.
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117 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
118 See Drop Dead Co. v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir. 1963); see
also, e.g., Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 669 n.7
(7th Cir. 1986) (“That the Players’ performances possess great commercial value indicates
that the works embody the modicum of creativity required for copyrightability.”); Amplex
Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (“If it be
argued that these drawings contain an extremely small degree of skill and originality, the
answer would seem to be that so long as they contain enough skill and originality to justify
another’s copying them, contrary to copyright notice against such copying, such copying
will be enjoined.”).
119 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52.
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It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive
until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether
the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end,
copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public
less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of
any public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say
that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. 119
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120 Id. at 249, 251.
121 See Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832, 838–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing Alva
Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
122 See, e.g., Paul Morelli Design, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d 482, 487 (E.D.
Pa. 2002). An exception to this general rejection or discounting of expert testimony on
creativity comes in cases involving computer software. See, e.g., Bus. Mgmt. Int’l, Inc. v.
Labyrinth Bus. Sols., LLC, No. 05 Civ. 6738, 2009 WL 790048, at *17–18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
2009); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 56 (D. Mass. 1990).
123 See Olem Shoe Corp. v. Wash. Shoe Co., No. 09-23494-CIV, 2011 WL 6202282, at
*11–12 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2011), aff’d, 591 F. App’x 873 (11th Cir. 2015).
124 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 218 (D. Mass. 1993),
rev’d on other grounds, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S.
233 (1996) (per curiam); Covington Fabrics Corp. v. Artel Prods., Inc., 328 F. Supp. 202,
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
125 Paul Morelli Design, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 487. In a recent case that evaluated whether
the rock anthem “Stairway to Heaven” infringed on an earlier song called “Taurus,” a twojudge dissent touted expert testimony on Taurus’s creativity. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin,
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Justice Holmes was not just singling out judges as somehow failing
to recognize innovative art at the time it is made. Throughout the
opinion, he dropped references to various European artistic
masters, 120 revealing his own erudition as well as the limits of his
supposedly self-deprecatory stance. Justice Holmes knew that he, and
many other judges, actually knew quite a lot about art. His position
was that no one could appreciate artistic contributions in their own
time, necessarily implicating art world experts as well as judges and
everyone else. By articulating a view of experts as always behind the
creativity curve, Justice Holmes walled off informed outsiders from
offering help to judges trying to decide whether something was
creative or not.
The modern creativity requirement displays the same judicial
antipathy to aesthetic expertise. Despite Bleistein, some older cases
relied on the opinion of art world experts to assess originality.121
Newer cases decline to rely on expert testimony to certify originality. 122
Judges invoke various strategies to exclude or discount such testimony.
One tactic is to conflate the two separate requirements for originality—
independent creation and creativity—by faulting an expert for failing
to disprove independent creation and then using that failure to reject
their creativity analysis. 123 Another move is to reprimand the expert
for applying too high of a creativity standard (e.g., novelty) in order to
ignore their testimony. 124 Judges also reject expert testimony on
creativity for usurping the role of the trier of fact. As one court
explained in justifying its exclusion of experts on both sides of a case
involving jewelry designs, expert testimony on “the subjects of
originality and creativity . . . [is] analogous to having expert witnesses
testify in a personal injury action that a party’s conduct was
negligent.” 125
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Skepticism of domain-specific expertise is also evident in the
Supreme Court’s recent Star Athletica decision. 126 Like Bleistein, Star
Athletica interrogates the threshold requirements for copyright
protection. The case involved a determination of copyrightability for
so-called “useful articles.” 127 For these articles, the law imposes an
additional hurdle beyond consideration of originality. Not only must
the useful article be original, but the creative expression at issue must
be conceptually separable from the useful part of the work.128 Without
such a requirement, the fear is that copyright protection would provide
the author with a lengthy monopoly over the utilitarian aspects of a
work that are better addressed by the patent system. 129
The Star Athletica Court rejected several tests developed by lower
courts for making this separability determination. Many of these tests
required the outside perspective of some authoritative source to
discern separability. One test relied on the judgment of art world
elites. 130 A different test favored by the Second Circuit asked whether
the claimed “design elements can be identified as reflecting the
designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional
influences.” 131 Other separability tests asked if outside audiences
would understand the design element, stripped of its functional
aspects, as art. 132 The Court needed to resolve the disagreement
between separability tests, some of which relied on outside resources—
art experts, the artist herself, or audiences—to inform when an
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952 F.3d 1051, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Ikuta, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Second, the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient for the court to instruct
the jury on this principle. Both of Skidmore’s experts testified that Section A of Taurus was
original and creative and gave Taurus a distinct and memorable sound.”), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 453 (2020) (mem.); see also id. at 1085 n.6 (contending that the concurrence’s
denigrating of the creativity of Taurus “would come as a surprise to the experts who opined
on Taurus—and indeed, would likely surprise any talented composer”). But a nine-judge
majority was unconvinced that the expert opinion should have any effect, concluding that
a jury instruction explaining that the protectable aspects of “Taurus” had to be created
independently and “by use of at least some minimal creativity” was all that was needed. Id.
at 1071 (majority opinion).
126 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
127 Id. at 1007.
128 Id.
129 See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 123,
135 (2018) (“Congress intended the separability requirement to distinguish applied art
from industrial design, making copyright protection potentially available for the former but
channeling the latter to design or utility patent protection.”).
130 See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980)
(highlighting expert testimony that belt buckle designs at issue “rise to the level of creative
art”).
131 Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987).
132 Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 2004).
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133 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007, 1015.
134 Id. at 1007.
135 Id. at 1013 n.2.
136 Both cases also work a dramatic expansion in the number of expressive works that
can enjoy copyright protection. Bleistein’s weakening of the originality threshold came at
the cost of granting copyright protection to the most pedestrian, uncreative works. Star
Athletica’s definition of separability makes everything separable, threatening to render all
design features on useful articles copyrightable. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C.
Fromer, Essay, Forgetting Functionality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 121 (2017)
(complaining that the first part of Justice Thomas’s test for separability boils down to “an
element of a design counts as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature if it looks like
something”); Rebecca Tushnet, Shoveling a Path After Star Athletica, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1216,
1223 (2019) (asking, in applying the Star Athetica analysis, “how could any object fail to have
aesthetic qualities if imagined separately from its function?”).
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article’s design feature can be separated from its utilitarian function
and thereby eligible for copyright protection.
The Court panned all of these approaches, citing to Bleistein in
support of a separability determination that avoids any outside
aesthetic assessment at all, whether from art experts, audiences, or the
author herself. 133 Instead, the Court offered its own test where a
feature of a useful article can be copyrightable if (1) the judge can look
at it and identify some two- or three-dimensional qualities and (2) the
judge can imagine the feature apart from the useful article. 134 Outside
expertise is not a part of the new approach to separability. In response
to a challenge from Justice Breyer, who contended that the Court’s
new test would lead to “the copyrighting of shovels,” Justice Thomas,
the majority opinion’s author, confidently stated that he, or any other
judge, would know “a shovel as a shovel” “even if displayed in art
gallery” and would not find such a shovel copyrightable.135
These two copyright validity cases, Bleistein and Star Athletica,
decided a century apart, are actually quite similar. Like Bleistein, Star
Athletica’s discomfort with using any sort of objective benchmark to
evaluate aesthetic progress reflects the influence of creative populism.
No outside evidence can help a court determine separability, including
whether the feature at issue should be imagined as having its own
independent existence. Both decisions abjure consideration of
context, relying on general judicial sensibilities rather than an
appreciation of the milieu in which the creative activity takes place.
Both cases articulate a vision of creative activity that does not allow for
the input of experts in the relevant artistic domain. 136
In sum, copyright’s creativity test does not pick winners and losers.
Instead, almost everyone and anything they produce is considered
legally creative. Rather than taking into account information on
authorial motivations, courts evaluating copyrightability embrace a
view of the creative process as swift and haphazard. Proxies that might
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provide useful clues to creativity such as comparisons to the
characteristics of representative works in a domain or evidence of a
particular author’s skill set are ignored. Behind the doctrinal choices
to shun expert testimony and information on authorial purpose is a
view of creativity as impervious to outside measurement and
unknowable to outside parties. The next Part examines how
copyright’s description of creativity matches the latest findings from
neuroscientific study of creative behavior.
II.

CREATIVITY: A NEUROSCIENTIFIC VIEW
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137 See JULIE WAGNER & DAN WATCH, INNOVATION SPACES: THE NEW DESIGN OF WORK
4–6 (2017).
138 Mary Donegan, Joshua Drucker, Harvey Goldstein, Nichola Lowe & Emil Malizia,
Which Indicators Explain Metropolitan Economic Performance Best? Traditional or Creative Class,
74 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 180, 180–81 (2008).
139 See Anne Harris & Leon de Bruin, An International Study of Creative Pedagogies in
Practice in Secondary Schools: Toward a Creative Ecology, 15 J. CURRICULUM & PEDAGOGY 215,
217 (2018).
140 See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 1 (1996) (“[A]n idea or product that deserves the label
‘creative’ arises from the synergy of many sources and not only from the mind of a single
person.”).
141 See id. at 6.
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Intellectual property law is not the only domain concerned with
fostering creativity. Policy decisions in pursuit of creativity shape many
if not most of the environments in which we live. Businesses design
workplaces to unlock innovative thought. 137 Urban planners set city
priorities in an effort to attract “the creative class.” 138 Teachers adjust
their pedagogy to encourage creative thinking in students. 139 Perhaps,
then, it is no surprise that psychologists have been attempting to
unlock the secrets of the creative process for years.
Most of their time and attention has been focused on
understanding the creative process as located in individual authors
and artists. But psychologists also believe that creativity must be
understood as existing in a larger framework beyond the individual
creator. 140 According to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s influential systems
model, creativity emerges from a dynamic interaction of three
elements: (1) the individual: the person (or persons) that produce
creative work; (2) the domain: an area of specialized knowledge; and
(3) the field: the hierarchy of people and groups who possess deep
knowledge of the domain and act as its gatekeepers. 141 Other creativity
models build on the essential insights of the systems model, such as its
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emphasis on the need to consider the prior art of each relevant domain
and the role of the domain’s anointed experts.142
It is only recently, however, that psychologists have gained a
markedly better understanding of the creative process so that these
models can actually be tested. 143 Thanks to machines that can reveal
neural processes as they happen, researchers now have the ability to
observe the biological hallmarks of creative thought. Though by no
means offering a complete map of the creative process, these
measurements confirm the broad outlines of the systems model and
contest the contrasting assumptions undergirding copyright’s
creativity requirement. At the individual level, motivation to create
turns out to be of central importance for creative activity, and
accidental production of innovative works is rare. Creativity is domainspecific, challenging copyright law’s one-size-fits-all approach and
related failure to engage with prior art. A flood of experiments reveals
tell-tale neural signs of expertise, which is not only necessary for
creative production but for consistently judging the degree to which a
new work departs from the conventions of the past.
A. Measuring the Creative Process
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142 See John Baer & James C. Kaufman, Bridging Generality and Specificity: The Amusement
Park Theoretical (APT) Model of Creativity, 27 ROEPER REV. 158, 158 (2005); Robert J.
Sternberg, A Triangular Theory of Creativity, 12 PSYCH. AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY & ARTS 50,
61 (2018).
143 See Malinda J. McPherson & Charles J. Limb, Artistic and Aesthetic Production: Progress
and Limitations, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra
note 9, at 517, 519 (describing the neuroscience of creative activity as an emerging area of
study that only became possible in the past decade thanks to technological advances);
Sternberg, supra note 142, at 62 (“A conundrum in the field of creativity is that many of the
theories, as posed, have been either difficult to disconfirm or simply nondisconfirmable.”).
144 See Eve A. Forster & Kevin N. Dunbar, Creativity Evaluation Through Latent Semantic
Analysis, 31 PROC. ANN. MEETING COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 602, 602 (2009) (discussing
limitations of early creativity research, including interviews with select creative individuals).
145 Ornstein’s Compositional Styles, in LEO ORNSTEIN, QUINTETTE FOR PIANO AND
STRINGS, OP. 92, xxiii, xxvi (Denise Von Glahn & Michael Broyles eds., 2005).
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Psychologists have been studying creativity for a long time. Much
of the early creativity research polled artists themselves, but with little
yield. 144 Artists refer to a process that is indescribable, confirming the
instinct of legal actors that artistic creativity is impossible to measure.
A typical example comes from the experimental composer Leo
Ornstein. “I have no theory,” he said. 145 “I don’t write music out of
any pre-conceived theory at all. I just write what I hear. Sometimes as
a matter of fact . . . some of the things I’ve written . . . I wonder why I
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should have heard what I did. I can’t explain it to myself.”146 Or take
this pronouncement from Bruce Springsteen: “Creativity is an act of
magic rising up from your subconscious.” 147 Unable to take artists’
recounting at face value, some psychologists resorted to Freudian
theory, attributing creative behavior to the sublimation of sexual
desires, a view of creativity that has now been discredited.148
Yet if talking to and psychoanalyzing artists was a mostly losing
proposition, using neuroscience to study the creative process has
generated significant insights. These insights have only been possible
thanks to recent technological advances. 149 Electroencephalography
(EEG) measures rapid changes in the electric and magnetic fields in
the brain. 150 Positron emission tomography (PET) uses a radioactive
tracer to detect areas of the brain exhibiting higher chemical
activity. 151 Most useful has been functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), which records fluctuations in oxygenation and blood
flow in the brain, revealing which areas and networks in the brain are
activated by different stimuli. 152
These techniques have been around for years, but greater
processing speeds allow for much greater insights into the mechanics
of human cognition.
Instead of relying on self-reporting,
neuroscientists examine the neural activity of artists as they are
engaged in creative tasks such as generating a humorous caption for a
cartoon, improvising music, or crafting a creative metaphor to capture
the meaning of a given adjective. 153 For these experiments, experts in


12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 197 Side B

146 Id.; see also David Bashwiner, The Neuroscience of Musical Creativity, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 495, 496–97
(quoting Brahms as describing musical inspiration as “a condition when the conscious mind
is in temporary abeyance and the subconscious mind is in control” (quoting ARTHUR M.
ABELL, TALKS WITH GREAT COMPOSERS 6 (1955))).
147 David Brooks, Bruce Springsteen and the Art of Aging Well, ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/bruce-springsteen-and-art-agingwell/616826/ [https://perma.cc/2MVS-Z36T]; see also Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No.
18-956, slip op. at 23 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2021) (noting, with approval, witness testimony that the
creativity involved in developing application programming interface software was “magic”).
148 See R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING CREATIVITY: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN
INNOVATION 15–23 (2d ed. 2012); Chambers, supra note 6, at 782.
149 McPherson & Limb, supra note 143, at 519.
150 Id. at 518.
151 See Steven Brown, Michael J. Martinez & Lawrence M. Parsons, Music and Language
Side by Side in the Brain: A PET Study of the Generation of Melodies and Sentences, 23 EUR. J.
NEUROSCIENCE, 2791, 2792–96 (2006) (revealing similarities and differences in anatomies
of musical and literary creation).
152 See McPherson & Limb, supra note 143, at 518.
153 See Ori Amir & Irving Biederman, The Neural Correlates of Humor Creativity, 10
FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE, Nov. 25, 2016, at 1, 1–2; Roger E. Beaty, Paul J. Silvia &
Mathias Benedek, Brain Networks Underlying Novel Metaphor Production, 111 BRAIN &
COGNITION 163, 164–65 (2016); Siyuan Liu, Ho Ming Chow, Yisheng Xu, Michael G.
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the relevant artistic domain independently evaluate the artistic outputs
on their relative creativity compared to the group of outputs as a whole.
If the experts’ evaluations display a sufficient level of consensus, their
creativity ratings are considered valid. The outputs can then be ranked
on a spectrum of low to high creativity and compared against each
participant’s neural behavior. 154 The value of such an examination of
the creative process lies in uncovering evidence of mental phenomena
that we are not aware of or cannot describe ourselves. 155 Because we
lack the tools to articulate the creative process as it occurs in our heads,
neuroscientific research offers a particularly promising mechanism for
understanding this process.
Perhaps the chief revelation from this research has been an ability
to measure creative mental activities. Contrary to the central premise
of Bleistein and a century of copyright creativity jurisprudence, some
aspects of the creative process can be objectively quantified. Not every
part of the creative process can be tracked and mapped by
neuroscientists. But even a partial inventory of this process represents
a great leap forward in understanding. A brief description of research
on “alpha waves,” the physiology of mental imagery, and the
connectivity of relevant brain regions illustrates the objective means
neuroscientists now offer for describing creative success and failure.
Findings involving alpha waves represent some of “the most
consistent findings” in creativity neuroscience. 156 EEG signals oscillate
over a variety of frequencies. 157 These frequencies are divided into a
series of frequency bands. 158 It is possible to compute the band-specific
frequency power for different periods of time and to contrast the
power in a specific frequency during a cognitive task and compare this
reading to a referent when the task is not being performed.159
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Erkkinen, Katherine E. Swett, Michael W. Eagle, Daniel A. Rizik-Baer & Allen R. Braun,
Neural Correlates of Lyrical Improvisation: An fMRI Study of Freestyle Rap, 2 SCI. REPS., Nov. 15,
2012, at 1, 6.
154 See Genevieve M. Cseh & Karl K. Jeffries, A Scattered CAT: A Critical Evaluation of the
Consensual Assessment Technique for Creativity Research, 13 PSYCH. AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY &
ARTS 159, 159 (2019). This assessment method has been described as the “gold standard”
for reliable creativity research. Id.
155 See Bashwiner, supra note 146, at 512 (emphasizing the value of neuroscience
because the mental workings of musical creativity are “too rapid to perceive in real-time”
making them “stubbornly inscrutable to science”).
156 Simone M. Ritter, Jens Abbing & Hein T. van Schie, Eye-Closure Enhances Creative
Performance on Divergent and Convergent Creativity Tasks, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCH., July 31, 2018,
at 1, 2.
157 Andreas Fink & Mathias Benedek, EEG Alpha Power and Creative Ideation, 44
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 111, 113 (2014).
158 Id.
159 Id.
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MARK A. RUNCO, CREATIVITY: THEORIES AND THEMES: RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
(2007).
161 Id.
162 Fink & Benedek, supra note 157, at 113.
163 See Roland H. Grabner, Andreas Fink & Aljoscha C. Neubauer, Brain Correlates of
Self-Rated Originality of Ideas: Evidence from Event-Related Power and Phase-Locking Changes in
the EEG, 121 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 224, 228 (2007).
164 See Andreas Fink, Barbara Graif & Aljoscha C. Neubauer, Brain Correlates Underlying
Creative Thinking: EEG Alpha Activity in Professional vs. Novice Dancers, 46 NEUROIMAGE 854,
860 (2009).
165 See Fink & Benedek, supra note 157, at 119.
166 See Laura M. Pidgeon, Madeleine Grealy, Alex H.B. Duffy, Laura Hay, Chris
McTeague, Tijana Vuletic, Damien Coyle & Sam J. Gilbert, Functional Neuroimaging of Visual
Creativity: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 6 BRAIN & BEHAV., Oct. 2016, at 1, 2; Sarah
Shi Hui Wong & Stephen Wee Hun Lim, Mental Imagery Boosts Music Compositional Creativity,
12 PLOS ONE, Mar. 15, 2017, at 1, 8.
AND PRACTICE 78
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Studies consistently reveal increased activity in the “alpha” EEG
frequency band during particular aspects of creative thinking. 160 For
example, college students rated “highly creative” by their instructors
exhibited higher alpha signals during the inspiration phase (as
opposed to the elaboration phase) of a creative writing project, but no
such difference existed for the less creative students. 161 More recent
research allows for a more fine-grained view of creative ideation by
dividing the broad alpha range into several sub-frequencies. Lower
frequencies in this range are more likely to apply to general task
demands like alertness and attention whereas higher frequencies are
more sensitive to specific task requirements like recalling relevant
words or numbers from memory. 162 Other studies show relationships
between types of alpha activation and a person’s subjective rating of
their own ideas as original, 163 as well as more successful performance
of different creative activities, including improvisational dance. 164
These findings do not tell nearly all of the story when it comes to
creative thought. But the “reliable and robust” relationship between
alpha power and creative ideation shows that objective measurement
of some aspects of creative thought is entirely possible.165
Neuroscience also allows us to distinguish between creative and
noncreative uses of internal images. Intuitively, we already associate
the creative process with the generation of mental imagery. It turns
out that the generation of such imagery is critical to visual and
nonvisual creativity alike. 166 Not all uses of imagery are creative. For
example, merely recollecting previously seen images is not a sign of
creative activity. Having a photographic memory might be useful in
life, but it does not make someone an artist. Luckily, scientists can
distinguish between the neural correlates of new mental images and
the signs of retrieving old images from memory. They conclude that
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the brain’s imagining of new images “certainly represents a crucial
capacity underlying creative thought.”167
Finally, neuroscience tells us that the stronger the interplay
between three particular brain systems, the more creative the
person. 168 When the strength of a person’s connections in this neural
network is measured, that measurement strongly correlates with how
someone performs on a test for originality. As researchers recently
found, “[A] person’s capacity to generate original ideas can be reliably
predicted from the strength of functional connectivity within this
network, indicating that creative thinking ability is characterized by a
distinct brain connectivity profile.” 169 For example, the greater the
coupling between the brain’s default and executive control networks,
the better test subjects completed an exercise asking them to suggest
uncommon verbs to pair with a given noun. 170 This relationship
between connectivity and creativity in creative individuals exists both
during and apart from immersion in the creative process.171
To those who question how any study can proclaim itself able to
separate the creative wheat from the noncreative chaff, it has been
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167 See Mathias Benedek, Internally Directed Attention in Creative Cognition, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 180, 187;
Rex E. Jung, Ranee A. Flores & Dan Hunter, A New Measure of Imagination Ability: Anatomical
Brain Imaging Correlates, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCH., Apr. 18, 2016, at 1, 2. Relatedly,
neuroscientists describe a close relationship between divergent thinking success and the
amount of detail someone can articulate when describing future events. See Donna Rose
Addis, Ling Pan, Regina Musicaro & Daniel L. Schacter, Divergent Thinking and Constructing
Episodic Simulations, 24 MEMORY 89, 94 (2016).
168 The brain systems are the default network, the executive control network, and the
salience network. The default network is a collection of regions that is triggered when
someone is engaged in a spontaneous thinking process like brainstorming. The executive
control network activates when there is a need for someone to focus and test in their minds
whether particular ideas could fit the task at hand. The salience network allows for
switching between the default and executive control networks. See Roger E. Beaty, Paul Seli
& Daniel L. Schacter, Network Neuroscience of Creative Cognition: Mapping Cognitive Mechanisms
and Individual Differences in the Creative Brain, 27 CURRENT OP. BEHAV. SCIS. 22, 22–24
(2019); Beaty et al., supra note 153, at 163–64.
169 Roger E. Beaty et al., Robust Prediction of Individual Creative Ability from Brain
Functional Connectivity, 115 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 1087, 1087 (2018).
170 See Roger E. Beaty, Alexander P. Christensen, Mathias Benedek, Paul J. Silvia &
Daniel L. Schacter, Creative Constraints: Brain Activity and Network Dynamics Underlying
Semantic Interference During Idea Production, 148 NEUROIMAGE 189, 191–93 (2017). Creativity
was assessed through latent semantic analysis, a tool used to measure semantic distance
between words. Id.
171 Studies find that evidence of greater than average coupling of these networks at
rest successfully predicts high performance on divergent thinking tasks. Liang Shi,
Jiangzhou Sun, Yunman Xia, Zhiting Ren, Qunlin Chen, Dongtao Wei, Wenjing Yang &
Jiang Qiu, Large-Scale Brain Network Connectivity Underlying Creativity in Resting-State and Task
fMRI: Cooperation Between Default Network and Frontal-Parietal Network, 135 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCH. 102, 109 (2018).
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172 See SAWYER, supra note 148, at 41–42.
173 See James C. Kaufman, John Baer & Jason C. Cole, Expertise, Domains, and the
Consensual Assessment Technique, 43 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 223, 230 (2009) (study showing
experts agreeing in their creativity assessments over 90 percent of the time); James C.
Kaufman, John Baer, David H. Cropley, Roni Reiter-Palmon & Sarah Sinnett, Furious Activity
vs. Understanding: How Much Expertise Is Needed to Evaluate Creative Work?, 7 PSYCH.
AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY & ARTS 332, 333 (2013).
174
Kaufman, Baer, Cropley, Reiter-Palmon & Sinnett, supra note 173. Quantitative
methods can also be used to measure creativity as with divergent thinking tests that are
scored based on number of responses as well as the statistical rarity of those responses.
Sameh Said-Metwaly, Eva Kyndt & Wim Van den Noortgate, Approaches to Measuring
Creativity: A Systematic Literature Review, 4 CREATIVITY 238, 245 (2017).
175 See RUNCO, supra note 160, at 37.
176 Russell A. Poldrack, The Role of fMRI in Cognitive Neuroscience: Where Do We Stand?,
18 CURRENT OP. NEUROBIOLOGY 223, 223 (2008).
177 Florian Hutzler, Reverse Inference Is Not a Fallacy Per Se: Cognitive Processes Can Be
Inferred from Functional Imaging Data, 84 NEUROIMAGE 1061, 1061 (2014).
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shown time and time again that the use of expert panels offers high
intra-panel reliability. 172 Regardless of the domain studied, experts in
a domain tend to agree in their judgment of expressive works.173 The
same is not true when researchers ask novices to rate artistic output for
its creativity. 174
Nothing I have written thus far should imply that neuroscience
can precisely measure creativity or that today’s technologies can
provide admissible neurological evidence of a particular plaintiff’s
mental state. Creativity is a complicated mental process that scientists
continue to explore. Some parts of creative ideation have moved into
sharper focus thanks to neuroscience. Others, like the incubation
period needed for some creative insights, are less susceptible to testing
in a laboratory setting. 175 Adding to the difficulty, the brain regions
studied in these tests of creativity can be involved in many different
activities, not just creative expression. With this kind of research there
is always the danger of reverse inference—crediting brain activation to
a particular cognitive process instead of acknowledging that multiple
processes might have prompted the activation. 176
Nevertheless, the last decade of creativity neuroscience studies
provides some valuable lessons. Some stages of the creative process are
more amenable to neural study than others, but even a partial
understanding of this process is better than none. Reverse inference
is a concern, but if applied carefully, it can have significant predictive
power and reveal useful correlations that can be further tested. 177
The main thing to take away from this research is that creativity is
not necessarily ineffable, a black box that can never be interrogated.
Measurements of alpha waves, mental imagery, and inter-network
connectivity do not tell us everything we need to know about creativity,
but they do offer objective information about a process that Bleistein


43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 200 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL108_BARTHOLOMEW_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

COPYRIGHT AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS

12/8/2021 10:26 PM

389

and other copyright decisions assumed had to remain shrouded in
mystery. This does not mean that individual plaintiffs should have
their brains scanned to reveal if they are sufficiently creative. But it
does mean that we should question the underlying premise behind
today’s lax creativity test: that creativity can never be understood by
outsiders.
B. Motivating Individuals
Although courts avoid consideration of authorial motives, there is
widespread agreement among psychologists studying creativity that
motivation is a key threshold requirement for creativity. 178 Motivation
increases artistic skill. 179 Intentional seeking of novelty is critical to
creative success. 180
The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio puts
motivation at the top of his list for requirements for human
creativity. 181
To the extent the originality threshold is meant to promote
creativity, it would seem that it should reward motivated creative
behavior and not reward non-creative behavior or behavior that
accidentally produces novel artistic output. 182 Psychologists note that
motivation results in more creative ideas being generated. Someone
who is unmotivated may generate only one solution to the task at hand
whereas a motivated artist is likely to generate many, resulting in
greater and superior creative production. 183 In other words, motivated
artists are more productive and the more productive you are, the
greater the chance that you will hit upon some creative ideas in your
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178 RUNCO, supra note 160, at 92; Panagiotis G. Kampylis & Juri Valtanen, Redefining
Creativity—Analyzing Definitions, Collocations, and Consequences, 44 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 191,
198 (2010) (collecting definitions of creativity to show that psychologists agree that
creativity is an intentional activity).
179 Alice W. Flaherty, Homeostasis and the Control of Creative Drive, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 19, 20.
180 Evangelia G. Chrysikou, The Costs and Benefits of Cognitive Control for Creativity, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 299,
305.
181 Antonio R. Damasio, Some Notes on Brain, Imagination and Creativity, in THE ORIGINS
OF CREATIVITY 59, 64–65 (Karl H. Pfenninger & Valerie R. Shubik eds., 2001).
182 Referring to accidental creations, Jeanne Fromer speculates that “works created at
least partially through a process other than an artist’s conscious will might involve sufficient
problem finding of the sort expected of artistic creativity.” Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology
of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1493 n.352 (2010). But this is assuming that
audience preference should dictate what is and is not creative as opposed to an
understanding of the creative process from the perspective of the author. See infra
subsection III.A.1.
183 See Flaherty, supra note 179, at 20; Dean Keith Simonton, Creative Ideas and the
Creative Process: Good News and Bad News for the Neuroscience of Creativity, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 9, 12.
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184 RUNCO, supra note 160, at 84.
185 See Darya L. Zabelina, Attention and Creativity, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 161, 164 (“A considerable body of
research suggests that creativity involves the ability to maintain an extended focus.”).
186 Benedek, supra note 167, at 189.
187 Zabelina, supra note 185, at 164; see Jung et al., supra note 167, at 2. Divergent
thinking involves coming up with multiple solutions to a problem. Tali R. Marron & Miriam
Faust, Free Association, Divergent Thinking, and Creativity: Cognitive and Neural Perspectives, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 261,
264.
188 See Mathias Benedek, Till Schües, Roger E. Beaty, Emanuel Jauk, Karl Koschutnig,
Andreas Fink & Aljoscha C. Neubauer, To Create or to Recall Original Ideas: Brain Processes
Associated with the Imagination of Novel Object Uses, 99 CORTEX 93, 99 (2018).
189 Marron & Faust, supra note 187, at 267.
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different artistic outputs. The accidental creation of art described by
Plutarch—a painter throws a sponge in anger and inadvertently creates
a masterpiece—is not the way the vast majority of artistic breakthroughs are made. “[M]ore often than not, the unconventional
tendencies of truly creative people are intentional and discretionary.
They know what they are doing.”184
Two particular attributes relating to motivation strongly correlate
with creative output. Focus, which can be detected by the techniques
of neuroscience, is a key ingredient in artistic production. Creativity
demands an ability to ignore outside stimuli. 185 According to creativity
researchers, originality requires the capability “to stay deeply absorbed
in self-generated thoughts, despite the constant exposition of
potentially interfering sensory stimulation.”186 A variety of studies link
focused attention to success on divergent thinking tasks, a favorite
metric for evaluating creative potential. 187 Neural scans describe a
relationship between focused attention and success in generating
novel ideas. 188
The focus necessary for creative activity is not just to keep out
external stimuli. Artists also need to be single-minded enough to
inhibit their own habitual responses. This may be why high originality
scores on a variety of creative tasks correlate with brain areas that relate
to executive actions. 189 Innovators need to be able to block out the
voices in their heads that tell them to take the cognitive path of least
resistance by doing things in a routine or traditional way or by simply
copying what came before. Originality demands that we ignore
internal and external forces that draw us to the average and the
familiar.
Artists must not only be able to focus on the task at hand, but also
commit themselves to sustained action in pursuit of a creative goal.
Various psychologists believe that the creative process occurs in various
phases and that the process begins with “an early ‘preparation’ phase”
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that is “difficult and time-consuming,” rather than sudden and
effortless. 190 “[C]reativity isn’t a burst of inspiration; it’s mostly
conscious hard work.” 191 Studies of successful creators show this to be
the case. For example, artists spend more time reworking their
drawings than non-artists. 192
Copyright law has long been enamored of metaphors suggesting
that artistic creativity appears like a bolt of lightning out of nowhere as
with the story of Plutarch’s painter. 193 The Feist decision amplified this
unfortunate tendency to equate creativity with speed. In that case, the
Court used the phrase “creative spark” to describe what was needed to
satisfy the creativity requirement, indicating that artistic creativity is a
sudden and unforeseeable phenomenon. 194 Along similar lines, the
Alfred Bell decision attributed copyrightable material to the immediate
influence on the artist of a “clap of thunder.” 195
Metaphors involving sparks and claps of thunder oversimplify the
creative process. Creativity involves multiple stages that take a
significant amount of time. 196 By portraying creativity as a sudden
phenomenon that comes out of nowhere, copyright law’s operative
metaphors imply that focus and sustained effort are irrelevant to the
creative process. In truth, “[c]reative thought involves the generation
of complex mental representations that need to be maintained over
extended periods of time for simulation and elaboration.”197
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Ulrich Kraft, Unleashing Creativity, 16 SCI. AM. MIND 16, 22 (2005).
SAWYER, supra note 148, at 387.
See Sydney Walker, Understanding the Artmaking Process: Reflective Practice, 57 ART
EDUC. 6, 10 (2004).
193 Weindling Int’l, Corp. v. Kobi Katz, Inc., No. 00CIV2022, 2000 WL 1458788, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) (“But even if the creative spark behind a commercial jewelry
design is more like a flickering match than a bolt of lightning, it nonetheless is entitled to
copyright protection.”); see also Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., Inc.,
768 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985) (copyright may inhere in “the work of an instant” and
“[t]he input of time is irrelevant”); 2 PATRY, supra note 45, § 3:33 (“[T]here is no empirical
correlation between time, talent, and money and the financial reward provided by
enforcing exclusive copyright rights. A work of great genius may be the result of an
instantaneous inspiration, while Hollywood annually churns out expensive flops.”).
194 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
195 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951). For
many years, patent law applied a similar metaphor involving speed—the “flash of creative
genius”—to describe the required level of inventiveness for patentability. See Cuno Eng’g
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (to receive a patent, “the new
device . . . must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling”).
Attacked for being both ambiguous and too high of a standard for patentability, Congress
crafted legislation to replace the “flash of genius” test with the seemingly easier to satisfy
requirement of nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
196 See SAWYER, supra note 148, at 88–90, 133 (describing an eight-stage process for
creative activity).
197 Benedek, supra note 167, at 189.
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This is not to say that creative problem solving occurs in a linear,
even-paced fashion. There are moments of insight. EEG studies are
particularly suited to uncovering particular brain regions involved in
those moments, which can involve seemingly sudden shifts in
perspective. 198 But it is important to realize that these moments of
insight are not all that is needed to generate something that is new and
appropriate to the artistic undertaking. 199 It turns out that creative
activity requires control over both outside stimuli that threaten to
break our concentration and internal forces that threaten to distract
us from the task at hand. Creativity is rarely speedy and rarely an
accident. “Even when ideas come in a flash, focus and persistence are
required to put them to good use.”200
C. Specifying the Creative Domain



C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

198 See Anna Abraham, The Forest Versus the Trees: Creativity, Cognition and Imagination,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF CREATIVITY, supra note 9, at 195,
200; see also SAWYER, supra note 148, at 198–200 (summarizing insight studies that use
neuroscientific methods).
199 See SAWYER, supra note 148, at 137–38; see also Robert W. Weisberg, On the
“Demystification” of Insight: A Critique of Neuroimaging Studies of Insight, 25 CREATIVITY RSCH.
J. 1, 13 (2013) (listing flaws in psychological study of insight).
200 Zabelina, supra note 185, at 164.
201 CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 140, at 23 (“If by creativity we mean an idea or action
that is new and valuable, then we cannot simply accept a person’s own account as the
criterion for its existence. There is no way to know whether a thought is new except with
reference to some standards . . . .”).
202 SAWYER, supra note 148, at 65.
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Creativity requires a comparison between the expressive product
at issue and the past work and shared practices of the relevant artistic
community. Without this domain-specific referent, the systems model
explains, there is no basis for determining what is creative and what is
not. 201 This is why highly creative people tend to be creative in one
particular domain instead of several; “it takes a lot of experience,
knowledge, and training to be able to identify good problems.”202
As established in Part I, copyright’s creativity analysis pays little
attention to domain-specific information. In contrast to patent law,
copyright law does not scrutinize prior art to evaluate the creativity of
the plaintiff’s contribution. Instead, the courts adopt an acontextual
posture, examining the work at issue for the creativity necessary
without comparing that work to the established practices or prior work
in the domain.
Psychologists posit a dual model of creativity with artists cycling
between idea generation and evaluation of ideas against a benchmark
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of standards. 203 To learn these standards, it helps to have training in
the domain. “Creative people are generally very knowledgeable about
a given discipline. Coming up with a grand idea without ever having
been closely involved with an area of study is not impossible, but it is
very improbable.” 204 It is important to know the norms, techniques,
and history of your chosen artistic field before you create. 205 Even for
those who seek to break boundaries, it is good to know what you are
breaking.
This is not to say that creativity is simply a matter of directly
applying domain-specific expertise. One still needs to find ways to
combine elements in new formations that are not obvious or
conventional. But domain-specific knowledge is critical to creative
success. Without first learning what’s already been done, a person
doesn’t have the raw material to create with. That’s why an important
part of the creative process is to first become very familiar with prior
works and internalize the symbols and conventions of the domain.206
All kinds of creativity require an understanding of the prior works
and shared assumptions of the relevant domain. 207 Copyright law
posits a great disparity between scientific and artistic creation, with the
former lending itself to objective comparisons against what came
before and the latter relying on the author’s subjective, personal
reactions. Like Justice Holmes, psychologists once believed in a wide
gulf between artistic and scientific creativity. 208 They divided all
creativity into lower- and higher-level processes, placing achievement
in “the arts” at the highest level. 209 By observing the same neural
phenomena in different kinds of creative tasks, researchers have called
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203 Mayseless et al., supra note 70, at 236; see Oded M. Kleinmintz, Tal Ivancovsky &
Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory, The Two-Fold Model of Creativity: The Neural Underpinnings of the
Generation and Evaluation of Creative Ideas, 27 CURRENT OP. BEHAV. SCIS. 131, 131 (2019).
204 Kraft, supra note 190, at 21–22 (2005); see also Carlos Blanco, Philosophy,
Neuroscience, and the Gift of Creativity, ARGUMENTA PHILOSOPHICA, no. 1, 2017, at 95, 108
(contending that “knowledge of the present status of a certain discipline . . . underlie[s]
the great triumphs of human creativity”).
205 See Chetan Walia, A Dynamic Definition of Creativity, 31 CREATIVITY RSCH. J. 237, 242
(2019) (“Knowledge of the domain plays a significant role in the process of creation.”).
206 SAWYER, supra note 148, at 93.
207 McPherson & Limb, supra note 143, at 524; R. Keith Sawyer, The Western Cultural
Model of Creativity: Its Influence on Intellectual Property Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2027, 2049
(2011).
208 David Pearson, Exploding the Myth of the Scientific vs. Artistic Mind, CONVERSATION
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://theconversation.com/exploding-the-myth-of-the-scientific-vsartistic-mind-57843 [https://perma.cc/5LKU-6LWT].
209 Chambers, supra note 6, at 781.
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that privileged role for artistic creativity into question.210 Today, the
consensus is that “[a]rtistic creativity may not hold a privileged place
in the brain after all.” 211 Domain-specific expertise is essential for
artistic creativity, as it is for all other kinds of creativity.
Along these lines, a prior theory that has been thoroughly
discredited in the recent creativity literature is the myth of people
being divided into two cognitive tribes: creative, right-brained, freespirited artists and analytical, left-brained, math/science-oriented
logicians. 212 It turns out that inventors are no less creative than artists.
The supposedly non-creative left hemisphere of the brain is actively
involved in all manner of creative tasks. 213 For engineers as well as
poets, the same process takes place: coming up with an idea, then
building on that idea so that it is useful. This process requires both
sides of the brain to be engaged. 214 To the extent copyright’s creativity
test depends on a view of artistic creativity as different in kind from
other creative thought processes, neuroscience shows this view to be
patently false. 215
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210 See Melissa Ellamil, Charles Dobson, Mark Beeman & Kalina Christoff, Evaluative
and Generative Modes of Thought During the Creative Process, 59 NEUROIMAGE 1783, 1791–92
(2012).
211 McPherson & Limb, supra note 143, at 524; see also Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property
Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 71–73 (2016) (recounting psychological evidence
showing that artistic creativity and scientific invention are interrelated processes).
212 Allison B. Kaufman, Sergey A. Kornilov, Adam S. Bristol, Mei Tan & Elena L.
Grigorenko, The Neurobiological Foundation of Creative Cognition, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 216, 219 (James C. Kaufman & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2010).
213 See A.R. Aghababyan, V.G. Grigoryan, A.Yu. Stepanyan, N.D. Arutyunyan & L.S.
Stepanyan, EEG Reactions During Creative Activity, 33 HUM. PHYSIOLOGY 252, 253 (2007); see
also Arne Dietrich & Riam Kanso, A Review of EEG, ERP, and Neuroimaging Studies of Creativity
and Insight, 136 PSYCH. BULL. 822, 825 (2010) (cataloging EEG studies of divergent thinking
to show that the notion of lateralized brain creativity is unsubstantiated for either side of
the brain).
214 Kaufman, Baer & Cole, supra note 173, at 221; Flaherty, supra note 179, at 30.
215 See Jared A. Nielsen, Brandon A. Zielinski, Michael A. Ferguson, Janet E. Lainhart
& Jeffrey S. Anderson, An Evaluation of the Left-Brain vs. Right-Brain Hypothesis with Resting
State Functional Connectivity Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 8 PLOS ONE, Aug. 14, 2013, at 1, 1.
(scans of over 1,000 people “not consistent with a whole-brain phenotype of greater ‘leftbrained’ or greater ‘right-brained’ network strength across individuals”); Robert H.
Shmerling, Right Brain/Left Brain, Right?, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G: HARV. HEALTH BLOG
(Nov.
8,
2019),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/right-brainleft-brain-right2017082512222 [https://perma.cc/DH79-H7XM] (“[F]or more individual personality
traits, such as creativity or a tendency toward the rational rather than the intuitive, there
has been little or no evidence supporting a residence in one area of the brain. In fact, if
you performed a CT scan, MRI scan, or even an autopsy on the brain of a mathematician
and compared it to the brain of an artist, it’s unlikely you’d find much difference.”). Law
professor Greg Mandel has noted the left-brain/right-brain dichotomy at work in various
aspects of intellectual property law to pernicious effect. See Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain
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D. Expertise
Copyright law’s populist stance enacts two myths about the
creative process into the substance of copyright law. First, the law
presumes that we are equally situated for creative success, ignoring
evidence of authorial experience and training. In truth, our creative
abilities differ. This is probably no surprise to most of us. We have
own thoughts about how creative we are compared to the average
person. Recent neuroscientific studies provide a wealth of evidence
confirming the unequal distribution of creative capacity. 216 Most
important for our purposes, these studies reveal that expertise is
strongly correlated with the likelihood of generating creative output. 217
Sheer familiarity with an art form produces dramatic physiological
differences during creative thought. In one experiment, neuroscientists scanned the brains of experienced professional comedians,
aspiring comedians, and a control group possessing the same high
intelligence as the rest of the research subjects but with no experience
as comedians. 218 All were given the task of coming up with captions for
a blank New Yorker cartoon. 219 Although it might seem that the quality
of humorous creations is subjective, it turns out that humor typically
has high agreement across individuals and can be evaluated for quality
through rankings as well as by listening for spontaneous laughter in
audiences. 220 The study revealed significant differences in the experts’
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Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 283, 283–84, 333 (2010).
216 There is a level of intelligence associated with creative output, making intelligence
a necessary but not sufficient condition of creativity. See Kai Zhou, What Cognitive
Neuroscience Tells Us About Creativity Education: A Literature Review, 5 GLOB. EDUC. REV. 20,
24 (2018). Some people tend to be more persistent or more flexible in the face of shifting
environmental demands, which facilitates creative output. Vera Mekern, Bernhard
Hommel & Zsuzsika Sjoerds, Computational Models of Creativity: A Review of Single-Process and
Multi-Process Recent Approaches to Demystify Creative Cognition, 27 CURRENT OP. BEHAV. SCIS.
47, 51–52 (2019). Different personality dimensions—openness, intellect, extraversion—
have been shown to be more or less linked to creative output depending on the domain at
issue. See Daniel Dostál, Alena Plháková & Tereza Záškodná, Domain-Specific Creativity in
Relation to the Level of Empathy and Systemizing, 51 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 225, 225–26, 234
(2017).
217 See Ioanna Zioga, Peter M.C. Harrison, Marcus T. Pearce, Joydeep Bhattacharya &
Caroline Di Bernardi Luft, From Learning to Creativity: Identifying the Behavioural and Neural
Correlates of Learning to Predict Human Judgements of Musical Creativity, 206 NEUROIMAGE, Oct.
25, 2019, at 1, 17 (describing “evidence for a positive linear association between expertise
and creativity”).
218 Amir & Biederman, supra note 153, at 2.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1–2.
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221 Id. at 10.
222 K. Erhard, F. Kessler, N. Neumann, H.-J. Ortheil & M. Lotze, Professional Training
in Creative Writing Is Associated with Enhanced Fronto-Striatal Activity in a Literary Text
Continuation Task, 100 NEUROIMAGE 15, 21–22 (2014).
223 Yasuyuki Kowatari, Seung Hee Lee, Hiromi Yamamura, Yusuke Nagamori, Pierre
Levy, Shigeru Yamane & Miyuki Yamamoto, Neural Networks Involved in Artistic Creativity, 30
HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 1678, 1688 (2009).
224 SAWYER, supra note 148, at 93–94; Kaufman, Baer, Cropley, Reiter-Palmon &
Sinnett, supra note 173, at 332, 335.
225 SAWYER, supra note 148, at 203.
226 See id. at 74.
227 See id.
228 See Kleinmintz et al., supra note 203, at 132; Joel A. Lopata, Elizabeth A. Nowicki &
Marc F. Joanisse, Creativity as a Distinct Trainable Mental State: An EEG Study of Musical
Improvisation, 99 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 246, 255 (2017).
229 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
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brain functioning while they devised their captions as compared to the
other participants. 221
Other research reveals differences in neural responses based on
experience. Experienced writers show stronger activation of the brain
regions associated with memory retrieval and emotion processing than
inexperienced writers. 222 Familiarity with professional design concepts
facilitates the inhibition of irrelevant visual memories in the brain’s
pre-frontal cortex, allowing greater focus on the development of a new
industrial design.223 This biological data complements older research
claiming that those recognized for great creative achievements needed
significant amounts of time to master their discipline. A common
postulate in the literature is that theoretical breakthroughs typically
require ten years of deep involvement in a domain.224
It is not just experience, but the kind of experience someone has
in an artistic discipline, that matters. “Brain imaging studies have
found that people with musical training actually think about music
differently, people with artistic training think about art differently, and
people with dance training think about dance differently.” 225 Contrary
to the popular belief that lengthy periods of institutional schooling
stunt creative potential, there is no slump in creativity as training
continues. 226 Children are no more likely to be creative than adults. 227
Given this research, scientists now believe that even spontaneous
creative mental states are better fostered through systematic
institutional training than informal training or no training at all.228
The second myth contends that no one—not even experts—can
assess the aesthetic avant garde. This was one of Justice Holmes’s
prudential arguments for broadening the definition of artistic
creativity to include anything that is the “personal reaction of an
individual upon nature.” 229 Justice Holmes warned that if courts failed
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to take such a hands-off approach to copyright’s creativity
requirement, new “works of genius” from modern-day Manets would
be cast aside since they could not be aesthetically appreciated in their
own times. 230
Creativity research calls Justice Holmes’s supposition into doubt,
at least when it comes to experts in the relevant domain. One
enduring misconception about creativity in Western societies is that
creative people are so far ahead of the rest of us that their brilliance
can never be appreciated during their lifetime.231 Creativity scholar R.
Keith Sawyer contends that, in actuality, most creative contributions
are fully recognized as such at the time they are made. 232 Many of the
most important creative contributions result not from something that
transforms the discipline but from a relatively straightforward process
like redefinition or combination of two previously uncombined
fields. 233 These are creative leaps whose value can be appreciated by
experts when they occur. 234 Quantitative studies confirm that artistic
reputations stay consistent over time and it is rare for an unrecognized
artist to be embraced as a genius after death.235
Justice Holmes also raised the specter of judges privileging what
they know rather than what is new when it comes to expressive works.236
This concern could surely apply to experts as well. Bias towards the
familiar is certainly a risk when evaluating new forms of expression.
But familiarity bias is a risk when evaluating all sorts of things, not just
art. 237 Despite Justice Holmes’s concerns, the creativity requirement
need not be synonymous with judicial taste for the familiar. Instead,
as described in the next Part, it is possible to evaluate creative
contributions against a baseline of what has come before rather than
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230 Id. at 251–52.
231 SAWYER, supra note 148, at 13.
232 Sawyer, supra note 207, at 2043–44.
233 See SAWYER, supra note 148, at 124.
234 See id.
235 See DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, GENIUS, CREATIVITY, AND LEADERSHIP 19 (1984); Victor
Ginsburgh & Sheila Weyers, On the Formation of Canons: The Dynamics of Narratives in Art
History, 28 EMPIRICAL STUD. ARTS 37, 63 (2010); Kathryn Graddy, Taste Endures! The
Rankings of Roger de Piles (†1709) and Three Centuries of Art Prices, 73 J. ECON. HIST. 766, 766
(2013).
236 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“At the
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated
than the judge.”).
237 See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901,
916–25 (2015) (examining cognitive biases causing judges to prefer familiar laws to
unfamiliar ones).
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by an expert’s or a judge’s personal preference. 238 Judges already
perform this sort of analysis when ensuring that inventive activity must
be “nonobvious” to be eligible for patent protection. Along similar
lines, a more specified creativity standard could prompt judges to look
for art that represents some departure from the status quo.
III.

HOW TO TAKE CREATIVITY SERIOUSLY

As demonstrated by Parts I and II, the assumptions about creative
thought governing copyright doctrine do not match the actual
mechanics of the creative process. Before updating copyright law to
reflect the realities of creative thought, however, we need to further
interrogate the advantages of a meaningful creativity requirement.
Some maintain that sheer production of artistic works, rather than
creativity, should be the touchstone of copyright law.
If creativity should remain part of the test for copyrightability and
the biological realities of the creative process taken into account, then
copyright doctrine is due for some changes. Authorial motivation
should become a formal part of the creativity evaluation. Courts
should abandon the art/science double standard and shift from the
current domain-general approach to a domain-specific one. Rather
than being treated as presumptively flawed, expertise should be
welcomed to help understand the appropriate baseline against which
to evaluate authorial output.
A. Should Everything Be Creative?

1. Production Problems
According to a committed few, “creativity should be banned from
the copyright analysis.” 239 The primary worry for those wishing to
abolish the creativity requirement is an old one: courts must avoid the
temptation to aesthetically discriminate between works, and even a
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238 Miller, supra note 22, at 477 (“Rather than judge a work based solely on our own
taste, we can judge a work by the ways in which the author’s individual voice stands apart
from conventional expression.”).
239 Karjala, supra note 5, at 201.
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For creativity abolitionists, legal scrutiny of the author’s creativity
should be replaced by the simpler and more achievable aim of
furthering the production of all works, creative or not. Such an
approach fails to acknowledge the text of the U.S. Constitution, the
costs of ceding the creativity determination to market forces, and the
structural benefits to judicial decision making from the presence of a
meaningful validity test.
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240 See Fellmeth, supra note 5, at 97–98; Frye, supra note 5, at 447.
241 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
242 Fellmeth, supra note 5, at 98.
243 Frye, supra note 5, at 428; see also Fellmeth, supra note 5, at 86 (“[T]he goal of
copyright law is . . . securing a sufficient quantity of expressive works for the public benefit,
with no very significant interest in the quality of the resulting works.”).
244 Frye, supra note 5, at 450; see also 2 PATRY, supra note 45, § 3:33 (“The overwhelming
number of copyrighted works . . . are everyday fare created without the slightest awareness
that they are subject to copyright and without any cultural content.”).
245 See Frye, supra note 5, at 450–53.
246 Fromer, supra note 182, at 1496. Fromer describes divergent thinking as “problem
finding” and convergent thinking as “problem solving.” Id. at 1470–71.
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weak creativity requirement is far too tempting. 240 This is the same
argument Justice Holmes marshalled so effectively in Bleistein. Justice
Holmes wrote that it would be a “dangerous undertaking” for lawyers
“to constitute themselves final judges of the worth” of expressive
content. 241 In accord, Aaron Fellmeth maintains that the creativity
requirement injects “an arbitrary and subjective bias” into copyright
law. 242
To avoid bias, Fellmeth and others argue that courts should get
out of the creativity business and simply let the marketplace determine
which kinds of expressive works are of value. According to Brian Frye,
“The purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of
economically valuable works of authorship, not creativity.”243 Buying
choices show that “consumers tend to prefer works that are generic
and familiar, and tend to reject works that are unusual and
unfamiliar.”244 For the creativity abolitionists, this disconnect between
marketplace behavior and copyright law’s preference for creative
expression demonstrates the current creativity requirement’s biased
application. They recommend punting creativity questions to the
audiences for creative works so courts can avoid charges of elitism and
sidestep the fraught question of aesthetic judgment. 245
Along somewhat similar lines, in a groundbreaking article written
a little over a decade ago, Jeanne Fromer approved of copyright’s
current subjective definition of creativity. She used psychological
studies of the time to suggest that audiences value divergent thinking,
which is “personal and subjective,” in art whereas they value
convergent thinking, which requires convergence on an objective
answer to a research question, for science and engineering.246 Fromer
acknowledged that the modern creativity standard is too vague and
needs more articulation, but, given public sentiment, she resisted any
increase in the creativity threshold for copyright protection. At its
heart, Fromer’s point was similar to that of the creativity abolitionists
in that she called for the creativity requirement to be aligned with the
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247 Id. at 1498. For scientific creations, Fromer found that the public is conditioned to
evaluate works according to improvements from past baselines and to treasure significant
departures from past learning, thus validating patent law’s contrasting approach to
evaluating creativity under the nonobviousness standard. Id.
248 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
249 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346, 363 (1991). Feist relied
heavily on two prior decisions from the nineteenth century: The Trade-Mark Cases and
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. In Feist, the Court found that the Trade-Mark Cases
established “writings” as requiring independent creation and creativity and that BurrowGiles read the same dual requirement into the word “authors.” Id. at 346–47.
250 See Beebe, supra note 99, at 330–31.
251 See id. at 330; see also Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381,
386 (2017) (“[A]cceding to relativism is itself a substantive aesthetic judgment, not an
avoidance of such judgments, as Holmes’s followers seem to believe.”).
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taste of marketplace. In her view, audiences tend to value subjectivity
and personality in their art but without too much “newness.” 247
There are a few problems with the position of the creativity
abolitionists. First, and perhaps foremost, there is a strong argument
that the U.S. Constitution requires creativity for copyright eligibility.
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution grants Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 248 In Feist, the
Supreme Court deemed the words “authors” and “writings” to both
have creative components, leading the Court to demand “more than a
de minimis quantum of creativity” for copyright protection. 249 Hence,
even if one agrees that the creativity requirement is wrongheaded,
copyright law is stuck with it.
Leaving the text of the Constitution aside, the supposed
impartiality of a validity test that only looks to productivity, creative or
otherwise, ignores the normative commitments embedded in such a
test. As Barton Beebe points out, 250 for all of its stress on aesthetic
neutrality, Bleistein put its own thumb on the end of an aesthetic scale.
By maintaining that judges should not evaluate aesthetic merit, the
Bleistein decision effectively adopts its own aesthetic theory, one that
equates aesthetic worth with a work’s “commercial value.” 251 Hence,
the choice is not really between a validity test based on aesthetic
considerations and one that does not consider aesthetics at all.
Instead, the choice is between a premium being placed on human
creativity or a premium on marketplace success.
A creativity abolitionist might respond that even if other values are
at stake in the determination of copyright eligibility, audience
preference should be the main determinant, not aesthetic expertise.
One might think of audience preference as the opposite of expert

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 206 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL108_BARTHOLOMEW_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

COPYRIGHT AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS

12/8/2021 10:26 PM

401



C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

252 See Miller, supra note 22, at 463–64.
253 See 2 PATRY, supra note 45, § 3:33 (exploring rationales for the creativity
requirement, including that creative works “culturally benefit society” in a way that other
works do not); Jing Zhou, Xiaoye May Wang, Lynda Jiwen Song & Junfeng Wu, Is It New?
Personal and Contextual Influences on Perceptions of Novelty and Creativity, 102 J. APPLIED PSYCH.
180, 180 (2017) (“Fundamentally, novelty drives differentiation and competitiveness; it is
the engine of growth.”).
254 See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 22, at 1519–21.
255 See generally Fromer, supra note 182, at 1459–83.
256 See supra Section II.A; see also SAWYER, supra note 148, at 133 (contending that
creativity research has historically tended to focus on the early stages of the creative process,
particularly idea generation, while neglecting the later stages, including problem solving).
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testimony as it relies on the opinions of those without special training
to determine the value in an artistic work.
Relying on audience sensibilities might jibe with the rhetoric of
copyright populism, but courts and legislators should be wary of
allowing audience tastes to govern the creativity requirement. First, it
may be a mistake to correlate “progress” with public sentiment. There
are benefits to prompting investment in unconventional artistic
expression, but those benefits risk being lost or at least suboptimally
realized if creativity analysis is anchored to popular opinion and
conventional tastes. 252 Patent law’s requirements of novelty and nonobviousness are instructive here. If there is no difference between
artistic and scientific creativity, setting a high standard meant to foster
innovation for patent validity while adopting next to no standard for
copyright validity seems inappropriate.
Society profits from promoting the production of works with a
high degree of originality. Such works prompt greater advancements
in the arts, literature, and related endeavors than low originality
works. 253 Also, a high creativity standard reduces the cost for aspiring
authors to produce their own works by limiting the number and scope
of prior expressive assets under copyright that they must create
around. 254 Allowing audience taste to set the standard for creativity
jeopardizes both of these benefits.
Second, objective measurements of several aspects of the creative
process are now realizable in a way that was not possible even a short
time ago. Fromer relied on creativity research in psychology that often
depended on the self-reporting of research subjects. 255 While such
reports are not per se unreliable, observable data about the creative
process realized through neuroscience provide a different perspective,
unlocking realities about that process that creators cannot articulate
themselves. 256 Recent work reveals both divergent and convergent
thinking is important to all creative activities, not just work in the arts
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or discoveries in the sciences. 257 Even if it is true that audiences prefer
their science objective and their art subjective, that may only be due to
a failure of public imagination given the historical inability to
objectively measure artistic creativity. 258 Although “the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt,” 259 neither should it be the
sole determinant for what is eligible for copyright and what is not.260
2. The Value of Validity
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257 Leslee Lazar, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Design Creativity, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1–3 (2018) (finding that design creativity, like scientific creativity,
requires innovation and utility in its outcomes and involves both divergent and convergent
thinking); Mekern et al., supra note 216, at 47 (“[A]ctual performance is likely to involve
some degree of interplay between divergent, convergent, and other cognitive (sub)processes
and process-related neural networks.”).
258 See Fromer, supra note 182, at 1478 (admitting that “the weight attached to problem
finding in the artistic domains” is likely due more “to our constructions of culture” rather
than human psychology).
259 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
260 See Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1914–15
(2018) (questioning whether market forces are the best determinant of value in expressive
works).
261 See Fellmeth, supra note 5, at 98; Frye, supra note 5, at 438–39.
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A slightly different objection to the creativity requirement does
not so much reject creativity’s importance to copyright law as question
the need for a specific creativity threshold test. According to this line
of attack, it does not matter if there is an ineffectual creativity
requirement so long as courts reach the right result through other
means. By employing the infringement analysis, fair use defense, or
other areas of copyright law to allow free copying of uncreative
materials, the argument goes, courts can incentivize creative
expression while preserving room to create for downstream authors. 261
For example, rather than denying copyright in an alphabetically
ordered phonebook for lack of creativity, courts should utilize the
infringement and fair use analyses to permit others to copy the phone
book without penalty. In other words, why not let everything be
copyrightable?
One problem with this approach is the effect it has on other areas
of copyright law. In the anatomy of a copyright lawsuit, the various
parts of that lawsuit—establishing the validity of the plaintiff’s work,
evaluating whether the defendant’s work is infringing, examining
whether the defendant’s work meets the criteria for fair use—are
interdependent. A flawed or nonexistent validity evaluation infects
these other areas of copyright law.
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262 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1986).
263 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2209
(2016).
264 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 107(2) (2018)).
265 See, e.g., Tresóna Multimedia, LLC v. Burbank High Sch. Vocal Music Ass’n, 953
F.3d 638, 650 (9th Cir. 2020).
266 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
267 Id. at 358.
268 Id. at 357–58.
269 Id. at 358.
270 Id. at 360.
271 Id. at 358–59.
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Infringement requires an analysis of whether two works are
“substantially similar.” 262 But the term “similarity” lacks content on its
own. The trier of fact needs to ascertain the protectable elements in
the original work so it can compare them to the defendant’s work and
make an infringement determination. 263 As a result, copyright’s
threshold tests for assessing the plaintiff’s eligibility for copyright
protection have a role to play in weighing liability for a defendant’s
conduct. Determining whether the defendant’s use comes within the
legal scope of the plaintiff’s rights necessitates some definition of what
those rights are.
The same is true of the fair use defense. One factor of the defense
examines the “nature of the copyrighted work,” narrowing the scope
of fair use for unauthorized use of “highly creative” copyrighted works
and broadening it for use of more factual works.264 This means that a
court’s appraisal of creativity when assessing copyright validity informs
a court’s analysis of fair use. 265 Ideally, a scrupulous eligibility
determination reduces the amount of analysis required in the
infringement and fair use evaluations; a creativity test that is not a test
at all makes the other parts of copyright law do all the work.
A case that aptly illustrates the structural problems with today’s
minimalist creativity requirement is Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel,
Inc. 266 Conan Properties (CPI) held copyright in several comic books
published in the 1970s featuring the character of Conan the
Barbarian. 267 CPI could claim an interest in what was featured in the
comic books, but not over the original Conan character who had been
delineated by Robert Howard in a series of stories in the 1930s.268
Howard’s stories had passed into the public domain. 269 CPI sued
Mattel for its He-Man action figure, contending the action figure was
too closely related to the visual representation of Conan in its comic
books. 270 Mattel defended He-Man by maintaining that CPI’s
character failed to meet the originality standard. 271
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272 Id. at 359.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, Inc.,
724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983)).
276 Id. at 361.
277 Id. at 361 n.14.
278 Id.
279 Id.
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The court seemed troubled by the lack of creativity in CPI’s Conan
yet refused to actually find insufficient creativity. The judge admitted,
“Just what, if anything, original CPI has contributed is difficult to
discern.” 272 He noted that Conan in the comic books looked no
different from a universe of hunky, superhero musclemen like
Hercules, Tarzan, and John Carter, all of whom had the same squarejawed and broad-shouldered appeal. 273 Yet rather than deeming the
creativity requirement unsatisfied, he latched onto the comment,
made by CPI’s attorney during oral argument, that CPI’s Conan
“possesses a uniquely styled musculature, which differs significantly
both from the other superhero hunks of the fantasy comic world, and
from the lithe, swimmer-like Conan depicted in the illustrations that
accompanied Howard’s books.” 274 Agreeing that “accentuat[ion] [of]
certain muscle groups relative to others” can “constitute[] the
protectable [sic] expression of an idea,” the court found CPI to have
satisfied the creativity threshold so that it could proceed in a battle over
infringement with He-Man. 275
The court then moved on to the infringement analysis and a
comparison of the two muscular heroes. The court found these works
were not substantially similar and that “no reasonable trier of fact
could conclude otherwise.” 276 But the only explanation it offered was
tucked into a footnote. The footnote stated that CPI’s Conan “is
probably no better muscled than body-builder Arnold
Schwarzenegger.”277 It then explained that Schwarzenegger had a fiftyseven-inch chest and twenty-inch calves when he won the Mr. Olympia
title in 1977. 278 Calculating that the He-Man doll, if enlarged to a
height of six feet two inches, would boast a seventy-one-inch chest and
twenty-nine-inch calves, the judge concluded that this difference in
musculature was enough for the two muscle men not to appear
substantially similar to the ordinary observer. 279
This infringement analysis leaves a lot to be desired. Although
Schwarzenegger played Conan the Barbarian in two feature films, it is
hard to know why he was the right template for evaluating the
characteristics of the Conan character as illustrated in the comic
books. Moreover, it seems unlikely that audiences would be able to
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280 See Mark Bartholomew, Copyright and the Brain, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 525, 547–54
(2020).
281 Cohen, supra note 17, at 1173.
282 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 263, at 2219.
283 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (discussing benefit of legal criteria
that prompt judges to consider all relevant factors and “remind them of their responsibility
to base decisions on more than mere intuition”); see also Joep Sonnemans & Frans van Dijk,
Errors in Judicial Decisions: Experimental Results, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 687, 714 (2011)
(advocating for reforms to cause judges to be less reliant on intuition).
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appreciate the differences in muscle size the court deemed so critical
given the small stature of the actual He-Man doll. A better approach
would have been to determine from the beginning that there was
nothing creative about the comic book Conan’s musculature and
decide the case on that basis, rather than rendering an opaque
decision that offers no guidance to those looking to design the next
swole action hero while avoiding an infringement claim from CPI.
It would be one thing if Conan Properties was an outlier and the
infringement test engineered to bear the burden of evaluating not just
similarity but sufficient creativity. In reality, however, copyright’s
infringement standard is even more nebulous than its creativity
requirement. We know very little about how judges determine when
one work is substantially similar to another 280 and nothing about how
juries make such a determination. 281 By fashioning copyright’s test for
validity into a rubber stamp, the current instantiation of the creativity
requirement exerts great pressure on the ill-defined test for copyright
infringement, making it harder for parties to predict the outcome of
cases and artists to know in advance whether their behaviors run afoul
of copyright law.
Rather than adding more weight than the substantial similarity or
fair use analyses can bear, it makes sense to structure copyright law in
stages. A staged approach allows for striking various balances between
rewarding authors and leaving enough raw material for downstream
users. Less attention to validity questions, including creativity, makes
the determination of a copyright’s proper scope in the infringement
analysis both more critical and more intricate. This can pose a
particular problem for jurors, who are unfamiliar with copyright’s
concepts and competing aims. 282 Conflating different analytical tasks
in a copyright lawsuit, instead of strategically apportioning them, can
also exacerbate tendencies to allow emotion or a desire to save
cognitive energy to determine an outcome.283
In the end, copyright’s current approach to creativity threatens
the very purpose of copyright law. Somewhat ironically, the danger
with an extremely generous creativity standard is that it may stifle
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creativity. The easier it is for authors to claim copyright protection,
the harder it is for downstream creators to come up with their own
non-infringing expression. Awards of copyright in uncreative material
invite frivolous litigation from copyright holders, thereby deterring
others who would otherwise engage in creative activity but do not want
to get sued. This argues in favor of narrow construction of copyright
entitlements. 284 The current creativity requirement acts in the
opposite manner.
B. Doctrinal Fixes
Fixing copyright’s creativity requirement requires attention to all
three parts of the systems model: the individual creator, the domain,
and the field. Considering artistic motivation will add much-needed
content to the creativity analysis. Instead of treating only scientific
discoveries as permitting a comparison with what came before and
artistic production as unyielding to any objective evaluation, an artistic
domain’s prior works and shared traditions can be compared to the
work at issue to privilege departures from the conventional. To
provide the content for such objective evaluation, the field of experts
in a domain need to be allowed to provide information to the trier of
fact. It makes little sense to continue to insist that the creative process
has nothing to do with authorial mindsets, domain-specific practices,
or expert judgments.
1. Making Motivations Matter

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

284 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW 26–27
(2010); Cohen, supra note 17, at 1197.
285 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
286 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (quoting BurrowGiles, 111 U.S. at 59–60) (summarizing late nineteenth century precedent); see also ROBERTA
ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE
UNITED STATES 81 (2009) (“According to the Court, although authorship was evident in
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By discarding evidence of authorial motive, courts greatly expand
the universe of copyrightable materials. Consider judicial treatment
of photography. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
deemed the new technology of photography an appropriate subject for
copyright protection, noting the various choices as to lighting, posing,
etc. that could be made by a photographer. 285 By no means, however,
did the Court imply that every click of the shutter generates a
copyrightable work. It explained that “an author who claims
infringement must prove ‘the existence of . . . intellectual production,
of thought, and conception,’” thereby suggesting only purposive
activities should be eligible for copyright.286
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Years later, a photographer’s intentional choices became largely
irrelevant to the copyrightability of photographs. Judge Learned
Hand speculated that all photographs enjoyed copyright protection,
regardless of motive. “[N]o photograph, however simple, can be
unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no two will be
absolutely alike,” he explained. 287 Today, “[a]lmost any photograph
‘may claim the necessary originality to support a copyright.’”288
This generous posture towards photography depends on the
exclusion of authorial narratives from the creativity analysis. Only on
extremely rare occasions do courts find insufficient originality in a
photograph. 289 Instead, for the reasons given in Part I, there has been
resistance to using artistic motive to add substance to the creativity
determination in photography cases. 290 Even the most thoughtful
opinions about the proper scope of copyright in photography contend
that the determination must focus only on the work itself and not the
decisions that went into making that work. 291
Blocked from examining authorial intent, courts in photography
cases tend to find that a work’s mere existence as a photograph
qualifies the work as sufficiently original. Eva Subotnik describes this
judicial reasoning as the “proxy of ontology,” and it has produced
some absurdity in recent copyright photography cases. 292 When a
crested macaque named Naruto took a selfie with a camera that was
accidentally left where the monkey could acquire it, a news agency
asserted copyright in the photograph. 293 The Ninth Circuit denied
copyright in the photograph, but not for lack of creativity. 294 Boxed in
by decades of case law pronouncing every photograph sufficiently
creative, the court of appeals could not find that Naruto’s click of the
shutter was uncreative. Instead, it was forced to rely on the different
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the photograph itself, the narrative supplied by the photographer was vital in assisting the
Court’s perception.”); Hughes, supra note 108, at 356 (“The [Sarony] Court only says that
a photograph can be copyrightable, not that every photograph is or probably will be
copyrightable.”).
287 Jewelers’ Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 934–35 (S.D.N.Y.
1921), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922); see also SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117
F. Supp. 2d 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The technical aspects of photography imbue the
medium with almost limitless creative potential.”).
288 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08 [E][1] (2005)).
289 See Subotnik, supra note 7, at 1521–23.
290 See supra Section I.B.
291 See Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
292 Subotnik, supra note 7, at 1513–14.
293 Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 2018).
294 Id.
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rationale that the copyright statute did not permit animals to be
considered “authors.” 295
Photography is not the only art form where failure to consider
intent contributes to the impotence of the creativity requirement.
Various digital technologies afford amateurs the tools to take constant
snapshots of their surroundings. Our phones record audio and video
any place and any time with the touch of a button. Easily accessible
software allows anyone to produce computer-generated imagery.296 As
we unthinkingly produce more and more content, copyright law
prevents courts from using the heedless nature of that production to
place a check on the expansion of copyright protection. 297
Taking evidence of motivation seriously will require the trier of
fact to scrutinize narratives of artistic initiative and not simply accept a
story of creative inspiration at face value. Although this kind of
interrogation of rationales for human behavior occurs all the time in
the courts, 298 today, a copyright claimant can demand protection for
their work without bothering to craft an explanation that suggests
creative activity. As Subotnik writes about ways of assessing the
creativity of photographs:
[A]s between an assertion that ‘if X is a photograph, then it is
original,’ and some compelling, or at least plausible explanation of
what a photographer was trying to accomplish, the latter is more
capable of being subject to scrutiny in litigation . . . and therefore
is a more justifiable basis for copyright protection. 299
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295 Id. at 425–26; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 39 (2017) (“Under current originality doctrine, then, the monkey selfie would
obtain copyright protection without issue.”); John Tehranian, Sex, Drones, & Videotape:
Rethinking Copyright’s Authorship-Fixation Conflation in the Age of Performance, 68 HASTINGS L.J.
1319, 1355–58 (2017) (criticizing the Naruto case for ignoring creative contributions that
do not involve fixation of the work into a tangible medium of expression).
296 See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54–80 (2008); Jessica
Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24 (2010) (attributing expansion of
copyright to shift to Internet as primary means of communicating and disseminating
informational works).
297 See Madison, supra note 5, at 831; Miller, supra note 22, at 478–79 (bemoaning how
originality jurisprudence “severs the link between expression and volition”).
298 See supra Section I.B.
299 Subotnik, supra note 7, at 1531.
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An additional argument in favor of considering evidence of
creative motivation in the creativity assessment is that, to a very limited
degree, it is already being done. As compared to the general approach
in copyright cases, courts have been more willing to probe authorial
motivations when the work at issue is a derivative work, i.e., one that is

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 210 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL108_BARTHOLOMEW_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

COPYRIGHT AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS

12/8/2021 10:26 PM

409

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

300 The Copyright Act defines “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more
preexisiting works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
301 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
302 Id. at 488.
303 Id. at 487–88.
304 Id. at 489.
305 Id. at 488. A vigorous dissent faulted the majority for allowing consideration of
artistic motivation to influence its analysis. Invoking the Alfred Bell decision, the dissent
stressed that even “an inadvertent variation can form the basis of a valid copyright,”
rendering “the author’s reasons for making changes . . . irrelevant.” Id. at 493 (Meskill, J.,
dissenting). “After the fact speculation as to whether Snyder made changes for aesthetic or
functional reasons should not be the basis of decision,” the dissent continued. Id.
306 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
307 Id. at 1269.
308 Bridgeman Art Libr., Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
For the most part, however, courts have declined the invitation to find insufficient creativity
in photography. See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010)
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heavily based on another copyrightable work. 300 In these situations,
when the derivative work must be analyzed to make sure it satisfies the
requirements for originality and is sufficiently distinguishable from the
preexisting work, courts sometimes look to authorial purpose. This
isolated trend in some derivative works cases should become a
formalized approach in all creativity evaluations.
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, a favorite of copyright casebooks,
illustrates the approach sometimes taken. 301 The case involved a claim
of copyright in a plastic toy bank modeled after a metal toy bank in the
public domain.302 A Second Circuit panel held that the plastic bank
was not original. 303 The majority deemed variations between the metal
and plastic versions of the bank trivial, in part, because the plaintiff
manufacturer made the changes for efficiency and cost reasons rather
than out of some creative vision. 304 Changes made only “in order to fit
into the required price range and quality and quantity of material to
be used” did not reflect a creative impulse so much as an attempt to
appropriate public-domain work. 305
A few other derivative works cases take the same approach. In
Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 306 then court of appeals
Judge Neil Gorsuch assessed whether two-dimensional digital models
of cars generated for an advertising campaign were deserving of
copyright. In concluding that the models were not original, Judge
Gorsuch highlighted the designers’ description of their modeling work
“as an attempt accurately to depict real-world, three-dimensional
objects as digital images viewable on a computer screen.” 307 Along
similar lines, a judge held photographic reproductions of works of art
in the public domain uncopyrightable because “the point of the
exercise was to reproduce the underlying works with absolute fidelity,”
which made them nothing more than “slavish copies.”308
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Cases like Batlin and Meshwerks are sometimes criticized for
employing their own, higher creativity standard. 309 But it is not so
much a different standard being applied as a different evidentiary
rule. 310 For good reason, cases involving the copyrightability of
derivative works activate the fears of judges that the would-be author is
only a copyist. As a consequence, judges tend to reach into their bag
of traditional legal tools and interrogate the parties’ motives. This
interrogation allows courts to assess creativity in a more searching
manner than in the average case. 311 Given what we now know about
the centrality of authorial intent to creative output, these tools should
be deployed in all copyright cases where creativity is at issue, not just
cases involving derivative works.
2. Avoiding the Art/Science Double Standard
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(“Except for a limited class of photographs that can be characterized as ‘slavish copies,’
courts have recognized that most photographs contain at least some originality in their
rendition of the subject-matter.”).
309 See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009); Dam
Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 2 PATRY,
supra note 45, § 3:55 (“Under the Supreme Court’s Feist opinion, there is a single test for
originality applicable to all works, derivative and nonderivative alike.”); Madison, supra note
5, at 846 (objecting to the moralism bound up in the term “slavish copying”).
310 Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 687 (2003)
(framing the creativity requirement as an evidentiary rule that allows courts to exclude from
copyright protection those cases where mere similarity in works is not enough to determine
that there has been impermissible copying).
311 This inquiry into the motivation behind derivative works may also be geared to
determining whether the independent creation criterion for originality has been satisfied.
312 See supra Section I.C.
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If motivation is critical to assessing creativity at the individual level,
an examination of the surrounding work in the relevant artistic area is
essential to understanding creativity at the level of domain. Such an
approach is regularly undertaken when it comes to evaluating scientific
creativity under patent law’s nonobviousness standard but is eschewed
in copyright out of a belief that artistic creativity lies beyond objective
comprehension. 312 The psychological study of creativity shows that
artistic and scientific creation are much the same and neuroscience
confirms that theories of left-brained, analytical inventors and rightbrained, unsystematic artists are false. Ending the art/science double
standard would allow courts to take into account relevant prior art for
a more rigorous evaluation of copyright creativity.
For decades, the standard protest to using prior art to evaluate the
creativity of artistic expression is that judges lacked the perceptive
abilities to do so. The creative process could only be understood by
the individual artist. Moreover, if judges did try to determine what
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313 Miller, supra note 22, at 462.
314 See W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 821 (2020)
(“Patent law pushes toward divergent innovation—either differentiating innovation or, if
the nonobviousness requirement works well, exploring innovation.”).
315 Miller, supra note 22, at 486.
316 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 828 (9th Cir. 2002).
317 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). The actual scènes à faire doctrine
is not an adequate substitute for a true creativity requirement. In addition to the term not
being sufficiently developed in the case law, some courts have held that scènes à faire cannot
apply to particular artistic domains, including visual works. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge
Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Becker, J., concurring). Also, scènes à
faire have been applied only during the infringement calculation, not the validity analysis.
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 4 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[B][4] (“[T]his doctrine does not limit the subject matter of
copyright; instead, it defines the contours of infringing conduct.”).
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deviations from existing work were significant enough to be
considered creative, they would inevitably pollute the analysis with
their own artistic tastes that hew to the orthodox rather than the avantgarde.
There is little evidence that personal preference will infect every
judicial attempt to compare the works of the past against those of the
present. As Joseph Miller asks, “[W]hy assume that the only alternative
to a minimalist creativity inquiry is a stifling aesthetic orthodoxy?”313
In patent law, the task is to evaluate the invention against the prior art
to see if the invention would be obvious to one skilled in the art.
Rather than encouraging conventional approaches or favoring the
tried and true, the nonobviousness standard encourages innovation. 314
Copyright’s creativity analysis could be structured similarly. If judges
were told to examine the author’s contribution for deviation from
what came before instead of for the right kind of deviation, artistic
innovation could be encouraged rather than disincentivized.
One potential objection to comparing the author’s work against
other works in the domain is that it would require not just creativity of
authors but novelty as the law suddenly lurches from allowing anything
“personal” to be copyrighted to awarding copyright protection only to
expression that has never appeared anywhere before. A creativity
standard based on prior art does not have to insist that a copyrightable
work be unprecedented in human history, however. Courts could
apply a lower threshold, only requiring the work to be different than
the conventions that dominate the domain. 315 In fact, courts already
employ a similar analysis in policing works for scènes à faire, those parts
of a work that are “standard” 316 or “common-place . . . within the
relevant field” and, as a result, not copyrightable. 317 For example,
because the maze and scoring table in the PAC-MAN video game were
“standard game devices,” these game elements were deemed scènes à
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3. Embracing Expertise
To appreciate a domain-specific view of creative potential, courts
need to be able to receive evidence from domain-specific experts.
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318 Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir.
1982).
319 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 66, § 2.2.1.
320 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 781–94
(2009).
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faire and a competitor’s use of similar elements not infringing. 318 Scènes
à faire jurisprudence shows that objective judicial review is not
synonymous with demanding complete novelty.
Some might object that greater emphasis on prior art would tax
artists with knowledge of the works in their domain that came before.
This is a burden we expect inventors to shoulder in patent law, but
ascertaining relevant prior art may be more difficult for artists. Unlike
patented inventions, there is no comprehensive registry of copyrighted
works for artists to consult. Advances in visual art, music, and literature
are arguably less susceptible to indexing than scientific and
technological improvements. 319
Still, we now know that knowledge of a domain’s prior works is
essential to creative production. Experience with and training in the
conventions of the domain are critical factors in the generation of
work that can transcend those conventions. If the goal is to align the
creativity requirement with the realities of the creative process, greater
attention to prior art makes sense. Given that psychologists posit that
the creative process demands domain-specific knowledge of what
works have come before, we should be skeptical of arguments that
authors cannot be charged with awareness of the prior art in their
domain. In addition, although beyond the scope of this Article,
proposals to make existing copyrighted works more searchable could
be implemented so that it would be easier for authors to find relevant
prior works. 320
From the perspective of the trier of fact, evaluating works against
prior art requires an ability to know what that prior art is and, more
particularly, what its common elements are. Sometimes judges may be
able to ferret this out on their own. Like everyone else in the early
1990s, the nine Justices hearing the Feist case were familiar with phone
directories and could confidently assert that alphabetical ordering of
names was not only typical but uniform for that product. In many
other cases, judges and juries will need additional information. This is
where my final recommendation and those who make up the field
come in.
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321 CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 140, at 38–40.
322 Fromer, supra note 182, at 1507.
323 See supra Section I.D.
324 Soucek, supra note 251, at 450–52.
325 Andrew W. Torrance, Beauty Fades: An Experimental Study of Federal Court Design
Patent Aesthetics, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 390 (2012).
326 See supra Section II.D.
327 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018).
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Domains differ. Some domains have more specific rules and more
total rules than others. 321 In some artistic areas, like jazz music or
experimental arts, “vast degrees of newness are expected and
acclaimed.” 322 Yet rather than welcoming such information to help
titrate the creativity standard in individual cases, courts have been
inhospitable to expert evidence in the creativity determination.
This is where perhaps Bleistein has had its greatest impact. As
discussed, Bleistein maintains that any evaluation of artistic creativity
involves a special kind of judgment that even the most informed
cannot agree upon. 323 The cliché “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”
controls discussion of aesthetic judgments in the law. Because courts
assume all expert opinion on such matters is simply a question of
personal taste, experts are blocked from informing judicial decision
making in a variety of aesthetic areas, including copyright law.324
In reality, judgments about art involve much more than simply
asking if someone enjoys an expressive work or thinks it has great
value. Even if taste is relative, agreement can coalesce over such topics
as what is the appropriate definition of a particular genre of visual art
or what are the conventions of a specific musical domain. Research
shows that those with expertise in a domain tend to independently
agree on their assessment of the creativity of new works in that domain.
Even if one thinks that a layperson’s judgment of an artwork’s beauty
is a “subjective practice [that] would normally be anathema to the
ideal of objective legal standards,” 325 elements of evaluation of
aesthetic worth can submit to reasoned interrogation, particularly by
those with experience and training in the domain. 326
The best proof of this comes from other areas of copyright law
that already welcome expert testimony to determine the value of
artistic work. Under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), artists
producing limited edition visual works can prevent destruction of their
works so long as the works are proved to be of “recognized stature.” 327
As courts have divined what “recognized stature” must mean, they have
promoted the role of art experts. In one influential formulation, proof
of recognized stature requires the testimony of “art experts” or “other
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members of the artistic community.”328 Although some subsequent
cases allow for alternatives to expert testimony, most decisions on
“recognized stature” highlight the central importance of expertise. 329
Even in those cases not mandating expert testimony, “generally
accepted standards of the artistic community” from other
informational resources were applied to determine the work’s
stature. 330
Expert testimony on creativity has also found its way into the fair
use defense. Courts routinely evaluate the level of creativity in a
defendant’s work to assess “transformativeness” for purposes of the
defense. 331 A transformative use employs a work for a different
purpose or in a different manner than the original. 332 On some
occasions, expert testimony on the subject is taken, 333 and some call for
more regularized use of experts to help inform this analysis.334
Expert testimony can be expensive, and one should be wary of
reforms to the creativity requirement that threaten to price out
deserving authors from vindicating their rights in court. Such
testimony will not be required in every case. In some situations, it will
be obvious that the plaintiff has reached even a more than minimal
creativity threshold and the parties will stipulate. 335 Judges will need
less help tracing the contours of some artistic domains than others.
For example, they may be familiar with the relevant conventions in
literary works, but lacking in such knowledge when it comes to
photography or appropriation art.
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328 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part,
rev’d and vacated in part on other grounds, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
329 See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 616 (7th Cir. 1999) (Manion, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Instances where expert testimony on this point
is not necessary will be rare . . . .”).
330 See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting
Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d at 84, aff’d sub nom. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020)).
331 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Tiered Originality and the Dualism of Copyright Incentives, 95
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 73 (2009) (“[T]he principal focus of [fair use’s transformativeness]
inquiry remains the defendant’s creative contribution to his or her use of the work.”).
332 Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2010).
333 E.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561, 2016 WL 1743129, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. May 2, 2016).
334 Holly Gordon, Note, Appropriation Artists and Testifying Experts: Reconciling
Postmodern Artistic Expression and Copyright Law, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 485–87 (2015); Monika
Isia Jasiewicz, Note, “A Dangerous Undertaking”: The Problem of Intentionalism and Promise of
Expert Testimony in Appropriation Art Infringement Cases, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 143, 171
(2014).
335 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, 372 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1116 (S.D.
Cal. 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 983 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2803 (mem.) (2021).
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Other areas of the law manage to accommodate expert testimony
on a regular basis despite its expense. In patent law, judges have
standardized the use of experts in claim construction hearings so they
can understand the claims from the perspective of “one of ordinary
skill in the art.” 336 Something similar in copyright law could be used
to allow the trier of fact to learn the metes and bounds of the relevant
artistic community. Without experts, judges and jurors are left to their
own intuitions about what seems creative and what does not. Given
the research showing the differences in how experts and amateurs
understand and evaluate creative works, it makes sense to encourage
parties to build a record illustrating the conventions and shared
practices of the relevant domain.
CONCLUSION
A common lament in intellectual property scholarship concerns
the lack of empirical information about the effects of different levels
of intellectual property protection on human behavior. 337 This
concern is most pronounced when it comes to copyright law. 338 We
are not sure about the role of copyright law in furthering creative
expression. Although the potential for financial remuneration would
seem likely to motivate artists, 339 plenty of artistic activity appears to
occur for free and without any awareness of copyright law. 340 Some
interesting empirical work is being done on the question of copyright
incentives, 341 but it is difficult to measure just how much total creative
output there is under different legal variables.


12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 213 Side A

336 Liz Brown, Remixing Transformative Use: A Three-Part Proposal for Reform, 4 NYU J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 139, 176 (2014).
337 See supra note 11.
338 See Fishman, supra note 1, at 1341; Christopher Jon Sprigman, Copyright and Creative
Incentives: What We Know (and Don’t), 55 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 455 (2017) (“Our copyright
system is, for the moment, built mostly on speculation.”).
339 “[N]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (quoting 3 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (George
Birkbeck Hill ed. 1934)).
340 JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149–60 (2015); Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The
Moral Psychology of Copyright Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2434 (2016) (“The past
decade has seen a flood of legal scholarship devoted to undermining the foundations of
copyright’s central incentivist narrative. This work has challenged the assumption that
money plays much of a role at all in motivating artistic production, suggesting instead that
the desire for subcultural status or the intrinsic enjoyment of the creative process are
stronger drivers of creative production.”).
341 See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman,
Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in Intellectual Property, 91 IND. L.J.
1251, 1251 (2016); Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer &
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Although it is unclear just how much legal rules stimulate artistic
activity, at the least, the rules for copyright eligibility should not run
counter to what psychologists diagnose as the conditions for curating
optimal creative environments. 342 Our failure to understand copyright
law’s incentive effects counsels caution, but ultimately a stronger case
can be made for changing the creativity requirement than retaining
the permissive status quo. A creativity test that is too easily satisfied
shrinks the supply of raw materials available for the creative work of
others. By considering evidence of authorial motivations, comparing
the work at issue with relevant prior works, and allowing experts to
inform the analysis, courts can reconstruct copyright’s creativity
determination to more closely align with the ways in which imaginative
expressive works are actually born.
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Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity
Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1922 (2014).
342 See Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neuroscience, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 735, 740
(2013) (arguing that it is important to align copyright law with the way the brain actually
works).

